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THE [TAKINGS} KEEPINGS CLAUSE:
AN ANALYSIS OF FRAMING EFFECTS FROM
LABELING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
DONALD

J. KOCHAN

ABSTRACT
Did you know that the "Takings Clause" was not called the "Takings Clause" by any
court before 1955? That was the first time that any court of any jurisdiction referred to the
provisions regardingtakings of privateproperty in either the federal or state constitutions
under the label "Takings Clause." Did you know that justices of the U.S. Supreme Court did
not use the moniker "Takings Clause" in any opinion before 1978? Given this history, the
phrase "Takings Clause," whether an apt descriptor or not, certainly cannot be justified as
the dominant way to refer to these provisions by contemporaneous usage at the Founding
nor by the weight of time. This Article gathers and analyzes originallycompiled data sets on
the usage of labels for this provision across time in court opinions, scholarship, and elsewhere. Acknowledging the fact that the label "Takings Clause" is of relatively modern invention, this Article questions its reign and evaluates the impact of such a "frame"for the rights
protected.
In framing what is supposed to be a constitutionalprotection by referencing the power
controlled, rather than the right granted, the rights component of the "Takings Clause" is
diminished. For example, we do not label the rights to freedom of speech or press in the First
Amendment as the "CensorshipClauses." We call them-quite appropriatelywith deference
to the rights and with a presumption against their infringement-the "Free Speech" and
"FreePress"clauses.
This Article posits that the provisions regardingeminent domain concern respecting the
means by which individuals can protect their "right to keep" property against a backdrop
where individual owners normally retain a right to refuse to sell property. As such, it ponders whether the "Keepings Clause" might be a more suitable label. While doing so, this
Article applies interdisciplinaryinsights regarding the power of "framing,"informing our
understandingof law in new ways from the fields of psychology, linguistics (including semiotics and cognitive linguistics), and the study of consumer products labeling in marketing
and advertising. (The last category is particularly unique; very little scholarship exists applying scholarly expertise in marketing to understand law and legal institutions.)
How we frame something affects our impressions of it, our expectations toward it, and
our concept of its boundaries and scope. When we frame something in terms of power-like
the "Takings Clause"-we provide greater legitimacy for that power and its exercise, and we
are likely to tolerate more of it across a wider scope. Conversely, when we frame something
in terms of protecting rights-like with the "Keepings Clause"-the presumption begins with
an expectation of keeping and erects a higher bar for a deviation from that position. Anyone
* Visiting Scholar, Center for the Constitution at Georgetown University Law
Center, Fall 2018; Parker S. Kennedy Professor in Law and Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. J.D.,
Cornell Law School, 1998; B.A. Western Michigan University, 1995. I am deeply indebted to reference librarian Sherry Leysen of the Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library for
her invaluable assistance in data collection and coding. I am also very grateful to Bethany Espinosa who assisted with formatting, initial coding, research, and editing; and to
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who cares about constitutionalrights will find transferablelessons in this work. Seeing how
framing operates with the property protections regarding eminent domain in the Fifth
Amendment provides lessons on how framing choices for other constitutional rights might
affect how those rights are perceived and how demanding the level of protection is for them.
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INTRODUCTION

It will probably surprise most people that the label "Takings
Clause" is a moniker of modern invention. In fact, the provisions in
the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment that identify the rights and
obligations associated with the eminent domain power-so often today labeled as the "Takings Clause"-had no label attached to them
in any state or federal court opinion for more than a century past our
Founding. "Takings Clause," for example, was a label not used in an
opinion of a court of any jurisdiction until 1955' and was only first
used by a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (in a dissent by Justice
Rehnquist) in the 1978 case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City.2 Due, in part, to the fact that the phrase "Takings
Clause" has no longstanding historical claim to legitimacy, and because the frame created by that phrase does not reflect the reality of
the rights protected within the provisions it labels, this Article questions whether there might be a better way to label the relevant provisions of the Fifth Amendment and corresponding state protections.

1.
2.

Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 408, 413 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Saliently, what most commonly and readily call the "Takings Clause" is
less about the government's power to take than it is about property
owners' rights to keep. Thus, this Article proposes that the "Keepings
Clause" might be a more appropriate moniker, consistent with our
choices to label other clauses in the Constitution by the rights protected.
Other parts of the Constitution that recognize personal rights are
named for the rights they protect rather than the government power
that might invade such rights. We do not call the First Amendment
clause related to speech the "Abridgment of Speech Clause" or the
"Suppression of Speech Clause," yet the clause or its interpretation
do in fact identify limits on the freedom and define how and when the
government may sometimes abridge or suppress speech. Instead, we
choose to call it the "Free Speech Clause." We choose the "Press
Clause" (or the "Free Press Clause") as our label rather than the
"Press Abridgment Clause" or the "Censorship Clause." The "Press
Clause" does not zoom in on the powers to abridge or censor or the
procedures through which restrictions will be allowed. Although
there are some proper procedures that allow for abridgment or censorship of press stories, our label for the clause broadcasts a presumption against such restrictions. When people want to gather, we
say that they are protected by the "Free Assembly Clause" rather
than describing it as an "Assembly Abridgment Clause," notwithstanding the fact that the clause concerns both the right and the
power and the right is subject to certain reasonable restrictions. The
Second Amendment "Right to Bear Arms Clause" similarly is not
plagued with a label as the "Gun Restriction Clause," even though it
has been interpreted to allow reasonable regulations of that right.
The Due Process Clause could very well be tagged as the "Deprivation of Life, Liberty, or Property Clause"; after all, the purpose of the
Due Process Clause is as much about deciding when and how the
government can deprive the rights to life, liberty, or property as it is
about defining some vague notion of "due process." Yet, we focus our
label on the rights-protective component rather than a rightsdiminishing label that would call our attention to the coercive power
elements.
These and other examples show that we often choose labelsparticularly for rights listed in the Bill of Rights-that honor the
rights to be protected rather than the limited powers available to the
government to intrude upon them. This is more than merely an issue
of semantic preference. This Article uses the "Takings Clause" as its
case study to illustrate that these framing choices are importantthey have consequences for the perception and operative strength of
the rights protections involved.
The empirical claims in this Article are that the naming (or labeling) and framing of rights impacts how many individuals-including
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property owners, the electorate judging the legitimacy and prudence
of governmental actions, the governmental actors identifying the
scope of their powers, the judges asked to evaluate the legality or
constitutionality of the government's acts, and others-perceive the
content and quality of the rights. The normative arguments in this
Article center on the benefits-in light of what we know about framing-of choosing an alternative label for the rights protections we
today commonly refer to as falling under the umbrella label "Takings
Clause."
This Article engages in an interdisciplinary analysis-engaging
law, psychology, linguistics (including semiotics, psycholinguistics,
and cognitive linguistics) marketing, and to a certain extent economics-to study whether the manner in which we "frame" a constitutional right affects our perception of the right's scope and the respect
afforded to it.3 Advertising experts, Al Ries and Jack Trout, for example, opine that "[1]anguage is the currency of the mind. To think
conceptually, you manipulate words. With the right choice of words,
you can influence the thinking process itself."4 By recognizing the
importance of a right to keep one's property by changing the frame
from the lens of a "Takings Clause" to a "Keepings Clause," we begin
to re-inject the idea that takings of property should be a last resort; a
true takings reform imperative should be to minimize the instances
of takings in the first place, rather than simply trying to manage
them as many reforms do.
The Supreme Court, in its June 2017 opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin, reinforced the idea that the right to keep (or retain) property is
an integral part of the Fifth Amendment calculus in any takings
case.5 The Court explained in Murr that "[a] central dynamic of the
Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence" requires "reconcil[ing] two
competing objectives central to regulatory takings doctrine. One is
the individual's right to retain the interests and exercise the freedoms
at the core of private property ownership. . . . The other persisting interest is the government's well-established power to adjus[t] rights
for the public good." 6 On the former, the Court stressed, "[p]roperty
rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world
where governments are always eager to do so for them."7 Justice
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2051 (1996) ("There can be no doubt that law, like action in general, has an expressive
function.").
4.

AL RIES & JACK TROUT, POSITIONING: THE BATTLE FOR YOUR MIND 203 (2001).

5. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).
6. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
7. Id.
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Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion in Murr, made similar
statements, in an earlier case, about the "right to own and hold" and
the "right to retain" property to describe the core rights involved in
the Fifth Amendment's takings provisions.' In his concurring opinion
in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,' Justice Kennedy explained, "[t]he Takings
Clause is an essential part of the constitutional structure, for it protects private property from expropriation without just compensation;
and the right to own and hold property is necessary to the exercise
and preservation of freedom."'o He continued, while explaining the
clause's application to the states through incorporation, that it involves "[t]he right to retain property.""
What many call the "Takings Clause" is about recognizing and
protecting the personal rights to private property. It is about limiting
governmental power. So why should it be named for the power rather
than the right? Perhaps a better name is the "Keepings Clause." This
reflects the dual nature of the protection found in the Fifth Amendment; the clause follows a property rule giving owners the right to
exclude the government from some takings (those for non-public uses) and a liability rule giving owners the right to be made whole with
compensation when eminent domain is necessary. A Colorado state
court succinctly stated the matter: "the power to condemn private
property is in derogation of the right to own and keep property,"
meaning that the "exceptions" in the constitution that permit its derogation "must be interpreted narrowly." 2
Some may argue that "Takings Clause" is more appropriate than
"Keepings Clause" because the word "taken"-which shares the root
"take" with "takings"-is at least in the words of the Fifth Amendment while no variation of the word "keep" is present in that text.
This is a fair point. However, I do not find those facts compelling
enough to rule out the superiority of choosing a "Keepings Clause"
label. First, there are good reasons to focus the label on the right being protected and, as this Article will detail, the right at issue is the
right to keep one's property. Second, to say that "takings" flows as a
derivative of something in the text ignores context. "Taken" exists, in
context, with "nor shall . . . be taken" 3 (or, as often reformulated,

8. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 734
(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 733.
Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)).
Akin v. Four Corners Encampment, 179 P.3d 139, 144 (Colo. App. 2007).

13.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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"shall [not] be taken"). Consequently, fidelity to words present in the
text, in context, does not lead to the logical adoption of "Takings
Clause." Indeed, if we wanted to remain as rooted in the text as possible, we would need to come up with some way to label it the "Not
Taken Clause"-and, the phrase "Not Taken" seems closer to "Kept"
or "Keepings" than it does to "Taken" or "Takings" which are its natural opposite.
"Keepings Clause" is also better than other alternatives to the
"Takings Clause" phrasing that have occasionally crept into the lexicon. It is superior to the "Just Compensation Clause," which is a tag
that minimizes the property rule component of the clause. It is also
more apt than the "Eminent Domain Clause," a label which focuses
on the power. Incidentally, "Property Clause" has already been
claimed in constitutional parlance to characterize Congress's authority over "Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"
in Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution.1 4 Moreover, because several provisions of the Constitution deal with "property," using that
general term in the label would be less specific than an alternative
like "keepings" that better reflects what type of property interest is at
stake in the Fifth Amendment provisions governing when property is
taken. In other words, using the term "keepings" better reflects when
the "right to keep" must give way to public use and the government's
responsibilities to fill the confiscation fissure in the owner's keepings
rights through compensation.
Part II presents extensive original data on the history of labeling
the rights and powers associated with the Fifth Amendment provisions regarding eminent domain. It examines usage in state and federal court opinions, at the U.S. Supreme Court particularly, and in
secondary sources. Part III surveys the usage of the phrases "right to
keep" and "right to retain" in the courts and in scholarly commentary. It then positions those cases and supporting authorities within
the constitutional framework surrounding enforceability of a "right to
keep" and the critical importance of maintaining a focus on property
under the Fifth Amendment's rights-protective elements. Part IV
conducts a breakdown of the component parts of the Fifth Amendment, articulating why the rights-protective elements of it are
grounded in a "right to keep" and support a framework that creates a
presumption for its protection. Part V provides the background interdisciplinary research to understand why framing matters. It presents
substantial research to support the conclusion that the frames we
create by the labels we choose have an impact on the substance of the
objects they frame. Part VI applies interdisciplinary framing re14.

U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 3, cl.

2.
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search to the Fifth Amendment and our expectations of it to illustrate that the content of the rights protected is impacted by using the
label "Takings Clause," and this Part discusses how consequences
will flow if our footing is adjusted to consider it something else, such
as a "Keepings Clause."1 5
Despite what some might think by observing the Supreme Court's
now (in)famous holding in Kelo v. City of New London"'-which unfortunately reinforced the notion that the power of eminent domain is
wide in scope with a minimal role for the sanctity of dominion and
control of ownership and sale-the Fifth Amendment is designed to
protect a strong "right to keep." In fact, it may be our framing of the
Fifth Amendment provisions as a "Takings Clause" that allows decisions like Kelo to emerge as acceptable interpretations of the Constitution-in part because we are starting with an implied presumption
favoring the power to take when the provisions are framed as governed by a power clause rather than a rights clause.
This Article examines whether individuals might tolerate broader
interference with certain rights, such as property rights, if the frame
for their protection is on the power granted to the government rather
than the right held by the individual. By analogy, think what might
happen if we called the Free Speech Clause the "Censorship Clause"
or the "Abridgment of Speech Clause"; we might be more willing to
start with an assumption that censorship is legitimate, so long as it
meets certain criteria for constraining the power. However, that is
not what we do. By framing the right as one to free speech, and as
freedom from censorship or abridgment, we start, by our choice of
words, with an infusion of the idea that the governmental interference is presumptively illegitimate and thereby the government is under a heavy burden to justify any intrusion.
Applying this reasoning to eminent domain power and private
property, this Article asks whether a better "frame," or label, for the
"Takings Clause" might be the "Keepings Clause," to reflect more
clearly a presumption to be generally free from takings of private
property rights and to be more consistent with how we label most
other important rights in the Constitution. Even if one disagrees
with that switch, there may still be something to learn from the
framing discussion. One could decide, conversely, that such framing
as the "Takings Clause" actually accomplishes an appropriate signaling of society's priorities between powers and rights. Whatever the

15. IRVING GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK 128, 156-57 (1981) (describing footing as the
way we align ourselves with a linguistic object and the capability to shift footing in the face
of a new frame).

16.

545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1028

[Vol. 45:1021

case may be, understanding the power of framing can help to identity
different levels of balance based on the accepted frames we have
placed on different rights. We must evaluate constitutional terminology-the use and choice of which has real world consequences in how
the law defines the line between power and liberty. As James Madison cautioned, after all, the U.S. Constitution marked a change in
approach. 7 "In Europe, charters of liberty have been granted by power. America has set the example . . . of charters of power granted by
liberty."
II.

THE HISTORY OF LABELING THE RIGHTS AND POWERS ASSOCIATED

WITH FIFTH AMENDMENT PROVISIONS REGARDING EMINENT DOMAIN

The Constitution and the Bill of Rights have few substantive
headings or labels that characterize their provisions. The Fifth
Amendment states, "[n]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." Nowhere in it are the words or label "Takings Clause." Nonetheless, that label is so commonly used
today to refer to those collected words that I suspect that few question its appropriateness, and most probably assume it has deeprooted provenance. This Part challenges the common wisdom that the
label "Takings Clause" has a long history. It evaluates the usage of
the labels for the provisions of the Fifth Amendment governing when
property is taken and what rights and powers are associated with
such governmental actions. This Part has two primary goals. First, it
intends to document the history behind labeling (and not labeling)
these provisions of the Fifth Amendment, which, of course, therefore
includes documenting the history of the usage of "Taking Clause" and
"Takings Clause." Second, it seeks to convince the reader that this
labeling history illustrates that there are no long-stretching historical moorings for the usage of "Takings Clause" that are so entrenched
as to be incapable of being unhooked. For those that might question
whether a "Keepings Clause" label is too novel, it is important to recognize that not only does the label "Takings Clause" have no grounding as the Framers' label, but also that the label we commonly use
today is not very old nor long-established itself, at least in the grand
scheme of time. Timespan of usage simply cannot be enough to make
"Takings Clause" a label to which we are bound.
A literature review finds very little evidence of scholars questioning the label "Takings Clause." Harrington comes close, but even his
17. JAMES MADISON, CHARTERS, NATIONAL GAZETTE (Jan. 19, 1792), reprinted in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 502-03 (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1999).

18.
19.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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work does not conduct a historical review of usage. Harrington seems
to implicitly acknowledge that there is no official name for the Fifth
Amendment protections, calling it "[t]he so-called Takings Clause"
while explaining his thesis on limiting takings protections to just
compensation20 and seeing no room for interpreting "public use" as a
substantive limit on eminent domain authority.2 ' In some ways similar to this article, Harrington's claim is that the label "Takings
Clause" is inapt for the substantive content covered by the rights associated with its usage.2 2 In that, I agree. However, as seen in Part
IV, this Article reaches some distinct conclusions on the scope of
Fifth Amendment protections. This Article posits that the "Public
Use Clause" indeed is, and should be, a meaningful constraint on authority, and it argues that "Compensation Clause" is a label that does
not adequately cover the nature of the rights protected in the Fifth
Amendment's provisions regarding takings. Nonetheless, this Article's extended study of the history of labels and its demonstration
that "Takings Clause" has no claim to superiority based in historic
usage-research not covered in Harrington's work-supports the
view that a label other than "Takings Clause" might better describe
the rights and powers at issue.
Using Westlaw, Lexis, and Ravel, I developed data sets for all judicial opinions within these relatively comprehensive databases that
used the label "Taking Clause," "Takings Clause," "Just Compensation Clause," or "Eminent Domain Clause."2 3 All U.S. Supreme Court
cases that used the phrase "eminent domain" were also scanned for
other possible label permutations and none were found.
Indeed, there are many cases dealing with issues of property takings where the constitutional provisions are not given a label at allthey are referenced in relation to the Fifth Amendment generally
with discussions about the acts, rights, and powers associated with
eminent domain, takings, and property rights, but without a label
frame. For most of this country's history, courts quite simply did not
see fit to put a moniker on the rights and powers at issue in the relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment.
20. See Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understandingof the
So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 1245, 1248 (2002) (contending that what "is
commonly thought to be a takings clause is in fact nothing more than a compensation
clause" and that the government already had the power to expropriate; the so-called 'Takings Clause" just created a limit on that power).
21. Id. at 1298-1301 (contending that "public use" in the "Takings Clause" is descriptive, not prescriptive, and that there was never an intended constitutional limit based on
"public use" as modern courts have engrafted).
22. Id.
23. The charts and appendices inside this Article provide some of the information
from the data sets. The complete data sets, with coding, are on file with the Author.
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The data for all federal courts and all state courts reported below
maps only the cases using one of the four labels listed above. It is a
far bigger project for another day to catalog all of the takings cases in
all of the courts where no label appears. Nonetheless, as explained in
a moment, the data for "no label" was compiled and coded for U.S.
Supreme Court cases.
This Article's data collection is also not attempting to control for
other factors like docket size, number of case opinions of any type in
a given year, all takings cases in a given year, or other interesting
variables. Such controls are not relevant here, because the data is not
presented to show trends demonstrating a usage in any percentage of
overall cases on the docket or total eminent domain cases. Instead,
the data is meant only to reveal the recent provenance of each label's
usage. Despite these limited goals, this Article's data compilation still
tells an important story-it shows the relatively recent emergence of
labels (see Figure 1).

2018]
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All commercial databases produced the same result for the first
known judicial opinion-in any federal or state court-to use the
phrase "Taking Clause" or "Takings Clause" to label the rights and
powers in either the federal or various state constitutions that today
we so commonly associate with those phrases. That first case using
"Taking Clause" (without an "s") was in the U.S. Court of Claims'
1955 opinion in Franco-ItalianPacking Co. v. United States, which
involved takings claims associated with the U.S. Navy's seizure and
impoundment of tuna boats during World War 11.24 The first state
court to use the label " '[T]aking' [C]lause[]" (also without an "s") was
the South Dakota Supreme Court in Hurley v. State in 1966.25 The
first U.S. Supreme Court opinion using the phrase "Taking Clause"
(without an "s") was in the 1978 dissenting opinion in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City (discussed further below).2 6
In 1889, the California Supreme Court was the first state court to
use the label "[E]minent [D]omain [C]1ause" in an opinion in the case
of Callahan v. Dunn.2 7 The first federal court to use the label
"[E]minent [D]omain [C]1ause" was the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri in the 1905 case of Johnson v. City of St. Louis.2 8
The first U.S. Supreme Court opinion to use "Eminent Domain
Clause" came in the 1977 case of Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services,2 9 but that case did not require resolving Fifth Amendment
takings issues. The first usage in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, in a
true takings issues case, was in the Penn Central dissent in 1978 (in
a dissenting opinion that used both "Eminent Domain Clause" and
"Taking Clause") .30
The first federal case of any type to use the label "[J]ust
[C]ompensation [C]lause" was in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in the
1923 case of Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, although that
case did not require the resolution of takings issues.31 The first U.S. Supreme Court opinion that required resolving Fifth Amendment takings
issues and used the label "[J]ust [C]ompensation [C]lause" was in the
24.

128 F. Supp. 408, 413 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ("The [T]aking [C]lause of the fifth amend-

ment [sic] is only a limitation on the exercise of a preexisting power. The defendant, as the
sovereign, possesses the power of eminent domain; i.e., the power to take property for private use without the owner's consent. This is an inherent power requiring no constitutional
recognition.").

25.
26.

143 N.W. 2d 722, 724 (S.D. 1966).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting).

27. 20 P. 737, 739 (Cal. 1889).
28. 137 F. 439, 422 (E.D. Mo. 1905).
29. 433 U.S. 425, 546 n.1 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 142, 153 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923).
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1969 case of YMCA v. United States.3 2 The first state court to use the
label "[J]ust [C]ompensation [C]lause" was from a lower court in New
York in the case of Watkinson v. Hotel Pennsylvania.33
Additionally, to focus insight on U.S. Supreme Court usage, I
started with the Congressional Research Service's (CRS) published
study by Meltz listing all "takings" cases in the history of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 34 eliminating those cases that did not actually deal
with takings (as the author of the CRS study acknowledged, the list
was slightly over-inclusive, incorporating some substantive due process cases). The "takings" cases from the CRS list were then examined and coded as (1) using no label and referring generally to the
substantive elements of the Fifth Amendment and its words; (2) using "Taking Clause" or "Takings Clause"; (3) using "Just Compensation Clause"; or (4) using "Eminent Domain Clause." The full results
of that coding are listed in a spreadsheet in Appendix A.
As Appendix A and the pie charts in Figure 2 display, "Eminent
Domain Clause" and "Just Compensation Clause" have seen sporadic
usage in recent decades at the U.S. Supreme Court level but received
little traction, while almost every takings case before the U.S. Supreme Court in the past three decades has used the label "Takings
Clause" alone (or a few times in conjunction with other labels) when
discussing issues in cases resolving takings claims.

32.
33.

395 U.S. 85, 89 (1969).
187 N.Y.S 278, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921).

34. ROBERT MELTZ, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (July 20, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-122.pdf.
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Figure 2
Usage of Labeling Phrase in U.S. Supreme Court Cases Resolving
Takings Issuesj
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As previously mentioned, the first reported usage of the label
"Taking Clause" in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion was in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, joined by Chief Justice Burger
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and Justice Stevens. 35 Thus, for the first 202 years of this country's
history and for 108 years after the Supreme Court heard its first case
truly requiring resolution of property takings issues, neither "Taking
Clause" nor "Takings Clause" ever appeared in the pages of a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion.
In fact, the Rehnquist dissent in Penn Central-arguing that there
should have been a finding of a taking in the case-can be identified
as the first usage of "Taking Clause" (without an "s") in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion to describe the Fifth Amendment provisions.
Further, Rehnquist made clear that he was using the label to collectively describe all aspects of the provision. 36 That dissenting opinion
used "Taking Clause" four times, including stating, among other
things about it, that there are "three key words in the Taking
Clause-'property,' 'taken,' and 'just compensation.' "37 In the closing
paragraph of the Penn Central dissent, the authors chose to also call
the relevant Fifth Amendment provisions the "Eminent Domain
Clause"-the first usage of that label in any opinion in a case requiring the resolution of takings issues at the U.S. Supreme Court. 3 8 The
majority opinion in Penn Central (written by Justice Brennan)which held that there was not a taking resulting from the refusal to
approve plans for an expansion of Grand Central Terminal in light of
historic landmark concerns-did not use a label. 39
The first time that "Takings Clause" (with an "s") was used in a
U.S. Supreme Court opinion was in the 1979 case of Andrus v. Allard, the Court's very next takings case after Penn Central.40 In
fact, Andrus v. Allard also marks the first time either "Taking
Clause" or "Takings Clause" was used in a majority opinion at the
U.S. Supreme Court, this one authored by Justice Brennan (who,
incidentally, you will recall wrote the majority opinion in Penn
Central that used no label). 4 ' In Andrus, the Court held that there
was no violation of Fifth Amendment property rights resulting
from the prohibition of commercial transactions involving avian
artifacts under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Eagle Protection Act. 4 2

35. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
See id. at 138.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
Id.; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104.
Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67-68.
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While the move toward including "taking" as part of a label for
these Fifth Amendment provisions started with the singular "taking"
in "Taking Clause," over time the dominant usage has morphed to
"Takings Clause" (with an "s"). The first federal court opinion to use
"Takings Clause" (with an "s") was in South Terminal Corp. v. E.P.A.
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1974.43 The
first state court opinion to use the label "Takings Clause" (with an
"s") was a 1974 Colorado Supreme Court opinion in the case of
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.4 4

43.
44.

S. Terminal Corp. v. E.P.A., 504 F.2d 646, 678 (1st Cir. 1974).
520 P.2d 738, 742 (Colo. 1974) (en banc).
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How and why the phrase "Takings Clause" (or "Taking Clause")
became popular is a subject for further research and analysis for another day. Perhaps it is as simple as individuals naturally gravitating
toward a variant of "taken" from the text (even if that is contextuallydeficient as discussed in the introduction because taken is preceded by
the negative "Nor" or "[not]"). But, with a skeptical eye, we may need
to investigate beyond assuming that it emerged spontaneously from
people looking for a label and thinking "Takings Clause" was a linguistically logical one. We should wonder whether there is a conscious effort to use the label to impact meaning and content. For example, can
we explain the emergence of the label as reflective of a shift in court
doctrine or treatment of takings or property rights more generally? Or,
can we connect the use of the label as a driving force that changed the
course of doctrine and treatment? Are there correlations or causations
to discover, or did the label emerge spontaneously, with any surrounding changes in doctrine being merely coincidental?
No doubt, a number of possible explanations might exist for the
emergence of the label, and a number of possible answers might apply for these and other questions. Those categories of inquiry and determinations of possible answers, however, are beyond the scope of
this Article. Nonetheless, it might be useful to briefly ponder some
possible explanations to get the conversation started. For example,
one might speculate that the rise of "Takings Clause" could be linked
to an increased recognition of broader powers to take-which would
be consistent with the idea that a label might reflect the dominant
values being advanced by the choice of words. Here, that could reflect
an increased tolerance for governmental power and a lessened sensitivity to the rights side of the power-rights balance inherent in the
Fifth Amendment protections. Another possible explanation might be
the rise in so-called "regulatory takings" challenges, which involved
cases that came with a need to identify what it means to "take" and
"not take" property, because only actual "takings" are included within
the scope of the protection.4 5 Within the jurisprudential space where
challenges to regulations that affect property values are adjudicated,
there has been a heightened need over the past century to distinguish between (1) regulations of ownership that must be tolerated or
else government could hardly go on (which do not trigger the socalled "Takings Clause," because only takings trigger it), and (2) actual interferences with property rights that rise to the level of constitutional takings (and thus trigger the Fifth Amendment protective
formula).

45. For an understanding of the field of regulatory takings, see generally STEVEN J.
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS (5th ed. 2012).
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Further research might also be done to determine when and how
the phrase was used outside of judicial opinions, such as in scholarship, case notes, briefs, and popular press. Perhaps such extrajudicial usage of the phrase influenced its usage in the courts. When
conducting such research, one might also ponder whether authors
who initially used the frame "Takings Clause" chose that usage with
an intended purpose, or whether they had a value-laden bias for a
particular substantive scope for the content of the clause. This Article
does not plow the field in these categories of sources, but it can provide some initial findings. One notable observation is that most (of
the small set of) authors using a label through the 1970s chose "Taking Clause"-without an "s"-rather than "Takings Clause" to describe the Fifth Amendment provisions. To signify the novelty or uncertainty of the usage, many of these early articles also put the word
taking in quotation marks,46 such that their usage was often printed
as " '[T]aking' [C]lause." 4 7
A search in HeinOnline's "Law Journal Library," 4 8 which is quite
comprehensive, but not exhaustive of all historic legal scholarship,
generates results identifying the oldest discoverable use in a legal
journal of "Taking Clause." (At least, HeinOnline produced the oldest
known journal article that this Author could find from scanning a
variety of repositories.) The label "Taking Clause" first appears in a
case note from 1936 in the Michigan Law Review. 4 9 The case note
was written by "R.E.T." who, from examining the list of the board
members,o appears to be a student named Royal Edwin Thompson."
The case in the note was about Oklahoma City's liability for a nui-

46. Like so-called "scare quotes," the technique draws attention to a unique or new
usage of a term or phrase.
47.

See, e.g., Arvo Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The

Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 770 n.13 (1967); Robert C. Ellickson,
Suburban Growth Controls:An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 418 (1977);
Donald G. Hagman, The Taking Issue: An Analysis of the Constitutional Limits of Land
Use Control, 87 HARV. L. REV. 482, 482 (1973) (book review); Henry P. Monaghan, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366
(1977) (book review).
48. Note that a search of Westlaw's "Journals and Law Reviews" database did not
turn up any hits before 1964. Thus, HeinOnline was the best source identified for the earliest usage.
49. Case Note, Municipal Corporations-Liabilityto Riparian Owners for Pollution of
Stream, 35 MICH. L. REV. 157, 158 (1936) (signed by R.E.T., summarizing and analyzing
Oklahoma City v. Tyetenicz, 52 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1935), which itself did not use a label for
the Fifth Amendment protection).
50. Case Note, supra note 49. This case note was also reprinted in Current Survey, 2
LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL GOV'T 202 (1936-1937).

51.

The masthead for this issue of the Michigan Law Review is available at

http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/1 1/Vol.-35-Masthead.pdf.
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sance.5 2 However, the student chose to discuss various theories of liability not covered in the Oklahoma case for why the city might be liable for damages, including the " '[T]aking' [C]1ause." 5 3 Thompson
stated, "[s]ome courts, ... would assert that the injury is only consequential, and not within the '[T]aking' [C]1ause." 5 4 To support that
proposition, Thompson cited to a case that was indeed a takings case,
but one that never used the label "Taking Clause"; instead, it simply
discussed takings issues by general reference to the Fifth Amendment
protection rather than a label.5 5 It appears the choice to use the label
was his own rather than dictated by the cases he was discussing.
The search in HemOnline returns a spattering of hits for the use
of "Taking Clause" between that case note in 1936 and 1964. Case
notes published in 195356 and 19615' each used " 'Taking' Clause"
once. In that same time period, the label "Taking Clause" was also
used in single passing references in two comparative law articles in
1958 and 1961 to refer to similar protections in documents other than
the federal or state constitutions.5 8 An Illinois attorney used the label
once in a footnote parenthetical in a 1963 University of Chicago Law
Review article.5 9
The first three discovered usages in articles devoted to scholarly
analysis of the Fifth Amendment's provisions on takings came in one
article published in 1962 and two articles published in 1964. Emerson G. Spies and John C. McCoid II-a professor of law and associate
52.

Okla. City v. Tyetenicz, 52 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1935).

53.

Case Note, supra note 49, at 158.

54.

Id.

55. Id. (citing City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 54 N.E. 1062 (Ind. 1899)).
56.

Gerald Krupp, Case Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Taking Private Property for Public

Use: Diminution of Value of Land as a Taking, 1 UCLA INTRAMURAL L. REV. 36, 74 (1953)
("The jurisdictions having only a '[T]aking' [C]lause in their constitutions are not in agreement concerning the meaning of the provision.").
-

57. Henry J. Price, Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain
Extension Of Fifth Amendment "Taking"To Include Destruction Of Lien Right By The Doctrine Of Immunity Of Government Property From Attachment, 59 MICH. L. REV. 957, 968
(1961) ("In its first consideration of the fifth amendment '[T]aking' clause, the Supreme
Court in the Legal Tender Cases held that 'taking' referred 'only to a direct appropriation,
and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of a [sic] lawful power.'

(quoting 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 451 (1870)).
58. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, ConstitutionalAdjudication in Japan, 7 AM. J. COMP. L.
195, 213 (1958) (discussing the "[T]aking [C]lause" in the post-war Japanese Constitution);
Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention to Protect Private Foreign
Investment: Comments on the Round Table, 10 J. PUB. L. 100, 108 (1961) (discussing arguments made in response to the " '[T]aking' [C]lause" being used in a draft international
economic cooperation treaty).
59. Donald W. Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional Practice, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 319, 337 n.93 (1963) (one very brief usage in a footnotediscussing "addition of 'or damaged' to the '[T]aking' [C]lause in state constitutions").
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professor of law, respectively, at the University of Virginia School of
Law-used "Taking Clause" several times in their 1962 Virginia Law
Review article on "Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent
Domain."o In 1964, Joseph Sax, then an associate professor of law at
the University of Colorado Law School, published the seminal article,
"Takings and the Police Power," in the Yale Law Journal, in which
he used the label "[T]aking [C]1ause" several times." (Notably, Professor Sax changed his usage to "[T]akings [C]1ause"-with an "s"-in
another oft-cited 1971 Yale Law Journal work, "Takings, Private
Property, and Public Rights," at which point he was a professor of
law at the University of Michigan Law School.) Also in 1964, Professor Daniel Mandelker of the Washington University (St. Louis) Law
School published an article-discussing inverse condemnation in proceedings published from the American Bar Association-wherein he
used "[T]aking [C]1ause." 6 3

60. Emerson G. Spies & John C. McCoid II, Recovery of Consequential Damages in
Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REV. 437, 442 n.20, (1962) ("(both cases denying recovery under

the [T]aking [C]lause)"); id. at 443 (mentioning "[T]aking [C]lauses"); id. at 450 ("Thus
some states have expressly refused to append the more liberal damage provision to the
traditional [T]aking [C]lause."). In one of their usages, McCoid and Spies explained:
Throughout most of the Nineteenth Century both federal and state governments operated under constitutions which made no mention of damages but
required compensation only if property were actually taken. In determining
what constituted a taking and what was property the underlying philosophy
was at first quite restrictive. The courts were concerned with the benefit to the
government rather than the loss of the individual. It followed that consequential losses almost always were noncompensable. This narrow and restrictive
approach was suggested in part by the natural connotation of the word "taking," and in part by the tendency of courts in developing any new concept to
emphasize concrete objects rather than abstract rights. Thus, time and again
courts denied compensation, despite obvious loss, on the ground that there was
no physical invasion of the property, no taking of possession, or no substantial
interference with a clearly defined property interest or estate. Helping, too, to
curtail the scope of what otherwise might have been recovered under these
'[T]aking [C]lauses' was the pervasive force of the then well-entrenched doctrine of sovereign immunity. If the sovereign were completely immune for its
wrongs, then surely in condemnation where governments committed no wrongs
at all, awards could properly be limited to the beneficial value of property
which the government physically appropriated for its own use.

Id. at 443.
61. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (labelling the
Fifth Amendment provisions as the "[T]aking [C]lause").
62.

Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149

(1971) (using "[T]akings [C]lause" with an "s").
63. Daniel R. Mandelker, A Review of Inverse Condemnation, in SEC. LOC. GOv'T L.,
OF THE ABA, 1964 REP. OF COMM. ON CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROC. 193, 195.
While providing a "[p]erspective on [i]nverse [c]ondemnation," Mandelker observed that:
The result is continuing tension and conflict between the immunity principle,
which bars suits against the sovereign for damages, and the constitutional
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A quick note on usage in briefs: The scope of coverage for briefs in
available databases does not lead one to have a high level of confidence that they have found the first brief on any subject or phrase.
However, I can report that the first usage inside the Westlaw briefs'
database to show the usage of "Taking(s) Clause," for example, was
filed in 1945 by the United States. 6 4 The federal government submitted a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court that used the label " '[T]aking'
[C]lause" in Lichter v. United States, a case involving takings and
other challenges to the Renegotiation Act governing excessive profits
from procurement contracts during World War 11.65 No other briefs of
any parties available in Westlaw's databases used the label again
until 1974.66
Finally, to get a glimpse at the larger societal usage of the mix of
possible labels, consider some observations on usage of the labeling
terms "Takings Clause," "Taking Clause," "Just Compensation
Clause," and "Eminent Domain Clause," as they appear in books
available in GoogleBooks.
Some informative results are generated by examining the corpus
of books collected in Google's Ngram function.6 7 This Google function
command to pay compensation. Either the court relies on the addition of a
"damaging" amendment to the [E]minent [D]omain [C]lause, or it construes its
"[T]aking" [C]lause to include an interference with the use of land, which is a
damaging because it affects less than the full title. Either way, tort doctrines
have been able to filter into inverse condemnation decisions . . . ."
Id. This article was also reprinted as Daniel R. Mandelker, A Review of Inverse Condemnation, in 3 L. NOTES FOR THE YOUNG LAW. 23, 24 (1966). Prof. Mandelker increased the frequency of his usage in a longer law review article on inverse condemnation in 1966. See
Daniel R. Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 WiS. L. REV. 3, 14, 38-39.
64. WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (follow "Briefs" hyperlink; then search "Takings
Clause" and filter results by date).
65. Brief for the United States at 23, 84, Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948)
(Nos. 105, 74, 95), 1945 WL 48823 at *23 & *84.
66. In the case of City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974), an
amicus brief and the respondents' brief filed on March 22 and March 23, 1974, respectively,
together used the language "Takings Clause," 'the Due Process and Takings Clauses," and
"the Due Process and Takings clauses."
67. Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ngrams [https://perma.cc/
6P5S-W6HA] [hereinafter Google Labs Ngram Viewer]. The Ngram viewer is based on the
model and database developed by authors of the following article: Jean-Baptiste Michel,
Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter
Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak & Erez Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, 331 SC. 176 (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2010/12/15/science.1199644
[https://perma.cc/
BNF7-P8N2] [hereinafter Michel et al.]. Readers can run their own search or alter the date
ranges to see other depictions of the trends by visiting the website. To start with the search
that produced these results, see Search of Terms in Ngram, https://books.google.com/
ngrams [https://perma.cc/D8WL-G6NX] (search "Takings Clause," "Taking Clause," 'Just
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has been described as "the first tool of its kind, capable of precisely
and rapidly quantifying cultural trends based on massive quantities
of data."6 8 This tool enables users "to examine the frequency of
words . . . or phrases . . . in books over time."6 9 The database accesses
"over 5.2 million books: -4% of all books ever published" when conducting a search and producing an Ngram.7 0 Even if this tool is a bit
raw and elementary, we can use it to observe some patterns in the
relative frequency of usage for particular words and phrases.7
The figure below presents the Ngram results for the terms listed
above from 1800 to 2008 (the last available date in the program). As
the graph shows, all terms have emerged only recently, and "Takings
Clause," in particular, is of relatively recent origin.
Each of these terms have only appeared in a relatively small
percentage of the overall books in Google's digitized collection, but
Figure 4 at least shows interesting trends in usage. Each line in
this Ngram represents what is called a "unigram" for each term.
The y-axis shows what percentage of all the unigrams contained in
Google's sample of books, written in English, includes the phrase
or term tested. "Usage frequency is computed by dividing the
number of instances of the n-gram in a given year by the total
number of words in the corpus in that year."7 2 Smoothing is ad-

Compensation Clause" and "Eminent Domain Clause"; restrict year range from 1800 to
2008)
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=just+compensation+clause%/
2C+takings+clause%2Ctaking+clause%2Ceminent+domain+clause&yearstart=1800&year_
end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&directurl=t 1%3Bo2Cjust%
20compensation%20clause%3B%2CcO%3B.tl%3B%2Ctakings%20clause%3B%2CcO%
3B.tl%3B%2Ctaking%20clause%3B%2CcO%3B.tl%3B%2Ceminent%20domain%20clause%
3B%2CcO [https://perma.cc/PMA4-WBDX].
68. Google Labs Ngram Viewer, CULTUROMICS, http://www.culturomics.org/Resources/
A-users-guide-to-culturomics (last visited May 15, 2018). See also Michel et al., supra note
67, at 176 (describing the database and related data collection tool).

69. Google Labs Ngram Viewer, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. John Bohannon, Google Opens Books to New Cultural Studies, SC., Dec. 17, 2010,
at 1600 (describing the Ngram project and its initial critics). The creators warn,
"[b]asically, if you're going to use this corpus for scientific purposes, you'll need to do careful controls to make sure it can support your application. Like with any other piece of evidence about the human past, the challenge with culturomic trajectories lie in their interpretation." CULTUROMICS, available at http://www.culturomics.org/Resources/A-usersguide-to-culturomics (last visited May 15, 2018) (operated by some of the creators). Suggestions for controls are available in the main paper supporting the application. See also
Michel et al., supra note 67, at 181-82. "Culturomic results are a new type of evidence in the
humanities. As with fossils of ancient creatures, the challenge of culturomics lies in the interpretation of this evidence." Id. (giving a few examples searches with interpretations).
72. Michel et al., supra note 67, at 176. The Google Ngram data is "normalize[d] by
the number of books published in each year." What's All This Do?, GOOGLE BOOKS,
http://books.google.com/ngrams/info [https://perma.cc/HRL9-HMDP] [hereinafter What's All

This Do?].
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justable and simply permits a consideration of the trends as a
moving average.7 3
Once individuals understand that the "Takings Clause" has no
claim to authority by reference to official name or even longstanding
provenance, the possibility that an alternative label could be appropriate seems less extraordinary. The next Part begins to set the
groundwork for considering the possibility that "Keepings Clause" is
a label that better frames the rights and power limitations in the
critical words of the Fifth Amendment. Part III explains the existence of a "right to keep" property in our jurisprudence, and it surveys
the authorities that have expressly recognized a "right to keep" property, or, as sometimes phrased, a "right to retain" property or at least
retain ownership rights that include the "right to refuse consent to
sell" or otherwise refuse to part with property.

73.

Google Books describes "smoothing" as follows:

Often trends become more apparent when data is viewed as a moving average.
A smoothing of 1 means that the data shown for 1950 will be an average of the
raw count for 1950 plus 1 value on either wide: ("count for 1949" + "count for
1950" + "count for 1951"), divided by 3. So a smoothing of 10 means that 21
values will be averaged: 10 on either side, plus the target value in the center of
them. At the left and right edges of the graph, fewer values are averaged. With
a smoothing of 3, the leftmost value (pretend it's the year 1950) will be calculated as ("count for 1950" + "count for 1951" + "count for 1952" + "count for
1953"), divided by 4.
What's All This Do?, supra note 72. In addition to providing the graphed results, searches
for terms and phrases also produce hyperlinks appearing below the graph, allowing one to
browse through the books available that contributed to the data set. Id. ("Below the graph,
we show 'interesting' year ranges for your query terms. Clicking on those will submit your
query directly to Google Books.").
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THE UNDER-APPRECIATED "RIGHT TO KEEP" PROPERTY

If you own something, you expect that part of what it means "to
own" is that you get "to keep" what you own. There is, or at least
should be, a legal presumption that a property owner has the "right to
keep" her property. It should be presumed that another private individual could almost never take property away from an owner without
consent-no matter how much they are willing to pay.7 4 That is called
theft (and other derivative terms). Moreover, it should be presumed
that, while the government might get to take property from an owner
without consent because it is the sovereign, even the government may
only do so upon satisfying certain conditions and when operating within certain constraints and limitations. Unless the government can satisfy those strict conditions, it cannot overcome this presumption and
override the fundamental "right to keep" property.7 5
Despite the intuitive appeal of recognizing a "right to keep"-or derivative terms for the same substantive right, such as the "right to retain" or the "right to refuse to sell"-it is strikingly used quite sparingly in case law and scholarly literature. It may be that keeping and retaining is so engrained into the concept of ownership, and seemingly so
obviously or subconsciously acknowledged as a part of what it means
to "own" something, that people seldom see a need to separately and
expressly announce its existence as a component of the ownership
package. To own is to control the disposition of the property.76
Sections B and C of this Part discuss the treatment of the "right to
keep" in the courts and scholarly literature. Along any of these metrics, it appears that the "right to keep" is grossly underappreciated
even if it is likely widely recognized as a constant but silent backdrop
to the meaning of property ownership. We begin in Part A with an
explanation of the omnipresence of the "right to keep" within ownership and some opinions on the strength of the right that makes the
paucity of express mention of the right puzzling.

74. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1560 (1998) ("Ownership of a right protected by a damages
remedy is not full ownership because the right is, in a sense, shared with any potential
interloper.").
75. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 555 (2005) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory] ("[L]egal enforcement of property rights should increase the property owner's probability of retaining possession of her
property . . . . The heightened protection effected by legal enforcement makes it less likely
that current owners would involuntarily lose their assets.").
76. The ability to control the fate of one's property is reflected in a variety of rights
associated with property, like the "right to destroy." See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The
Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005). One might say that the greater right to destroy
includes the lesser right to control disposition as well.
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The Meaning, Presence, and Value of the 'Right to Keep"

The "bundle of sticks" is a useful metaphor for describing elements
of property ownership, and it seems logical to include the "right to
keep" as one of the sticks.7 7 Each "stick" in "the bundle" represents
some specific attribute of such ownership. Guzman lays out what the
bundle of sticks means-focusing on several of the sticks, but like so
many explications of ownership, not directly mentioning retention:
Legal theory divorces the term "property" from the item itself to instead describe relative rights vis-a-vis that item. "Property" thus
means things one can do with Blackacre (entitlements) including its
use, possession[,] and consumption, as well as enjoying its fruits, the
ability to exclude others from its use, and the ability to transfer it.
Although ownership suggests the assemblage of all such rights in
one person who then totes the full "bundle of sticks," one may
properly speak of "owning" a lone entitlement or stick .... Legally,
78
the right itself is the property.
Although Guzman and many others who discuss ownership seldom
mention keeping or retaining what one owns, the things they do mention lend support. One cannot fully consume if they cannot keep. Possession seems less powerful if it is not presumed infinite-or that one
can keep and possess forever what they own. Furthermore, the right
to refuse to sell is a logical extension of the right to exclude.7 9 And,
the ability to transfer property should include the power to choose
not to transfer it-in other words, to keep it.
In previous work, I have catalogued a variety of legal doctrines in
which, what I call, "keepings" elements exist-where the "right to
keep" is impliedly recognized by the way we have constructed a variety of legal doctrines, presumptions, principles, and the like.o It is
not necessary to revisit that survey and analysis in this Article.
However, it is worth reiterating that,

77. "A common idiom describes property as a 'bundle of sticks'-a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property." United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129
(2000 ed. 1928)); Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984); see generally Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57 (2013)
(making the case for the utility of the bundle of sticks metaphor for understanding many of
the issues related to property in property law).
78. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
ConsolidationAct, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 614-15 (2000).
79. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 598 ("[T]he right to exclude protects the owner's ability to preserve idiosyncratic values, such as her subjective attachment
to the property. In other words, the right to exclude defends the owner's ability to extract
the full value of ownership right before departing with it.").
80. See generally Donald J. Kochan, Keepings, 23 N.Y.U ENVTL. L.J. 355 (2015).
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[W]e generate the legal rules of acquisition of property as a means
of (1) incentivizing desired action and investment; and (2) rewarding those who engage in certain behaviors and activities with the
product of their investment. If we determine that someone owns
something, then we generate rules and build the legal architecture
to protect that ownership . . . to allow people to keep what they
own as long as they so desire. Keepings is a theme that helps us
understand the formulation of these components of the property
law system.'

In his influential treatise on property law, Joseph Singer alludes
briefly to the general proposition that the law reflects the "right to
keep" property. In a passage introducing adverse possession, he
writes that "[o]wners generally have the power to transfer their property rights, and the obverse seems to be the right not to give up your
rights until you wish to do so."82 Singer's observations here are one of
the rare places in the literature where the idea of a "right to keep" is
expressly discussed. Singer continues, positioning "[t]he right to keep
your property until you want to part with it"8 3 as something that is
"as important, or more important, than the right to exclude or the
privilege to use property."8 4
The existence of the "right to keep" is further evidenced by the
way owners value what they own. One impressive study by Jeffrey
Rachlinski and Forest Jourden on that matter concludes that the
premium value that individuals place on items they own-often
called the "endowment effect"-can best be explained by those individuals placing a price on their "right to refuse." 5
Before turning to their findings, a bit of background on the endowment effect is useful. Behavioral experts Daniel Kahneman, Jack
Knetsch, Richard Thaler, and Amos Tversky have, over time, conducted various studies that have inspired substantial research on the
tendency of individuals to value items they already own more than
they would the same item if purchasing it for the first time-the "endowment effect."" In other words, "[t]he price people are willing to
81. Id. at 358.
82.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY §4.1 (3d ed. 2010).

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 74, at 1542, 1544.
86. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193
(1991); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Richard H. Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer

Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980).
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pay for a particular good is often significantly less than the price they
are willing to accept to give up the same good."8 The owners-or
sellers "endowed" with a good-have some reason to give the item in
their possession this higher value, which is seemingly related to some
characteristics now attached to the item as a result of possession or
ownership.
While many studies demonstrate the existence of this "endowment
effect," a definitive answer regarding why it occurs has yet to be settled upon.8 8 The leading justification is "loss aversion"; in other
words, owners have an aversion against losing things (and feel pain
when they must give something up), which is separate and apart
from the feeling before one acquires something, when there is nothing to lose.89
Rachlinski and Jourden conducted an empirical study aimed at isolating why individuals demand higher prices, and would be willing to
accept such price, in order to part with things they own.90 Their research was also focused on identifying why individuals react differently to property rules versus liability rules.9 ' Their study counsels how
the law can reduce the endowment effect when desired to avoid inefficient exchanges that it may create or when the effect otherwise acts as
a barrier to exchange.9 2 The study lays out their conclusions that property rules can sometimes impede trade, because they allow owners to
refuse efficient deals, while liability rules do not.93 The consequences of
those conclusions are beyond the scope of this Article.
However, in the process of reaching those larger conclusions and
settling on certain prescriptions, Rachlinski and Jourden's research
revealed something very important about the "right to keep," or, as
they framed it, the right to refuse to sell. Their findings provided "evidence that people do not regard rights protected by damages remedies as being owned in the same way as rights protected by injunctive
relief. The former can be taken by another without the right holder's
permission, whereas the latter cannot be taken without the right

87.

Sara Loughran Dommer & Vanitha Swaminathan, Explaining the Endowment

Effect Through Ownership: The Role of Identity, Gender, and Self-Threat, 39 J. CONSUMER

RES. 1034, 1034 (2013).
88. Id.
89.

Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 86; Thaler, supra note 86.

90.

See generally Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 74.

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. But see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and
Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV.
219, 254 (2001) (reaching different prescriptive conclusions than Rachlinski and Jourden,
arguing for the efficiency of property rules).

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1050

[Vol. 45:1021

'

holder's permission."9 4 Consequently, "[t]he power to refuse to sell a
right is a critical psychological component of ownership, and damages
remedies do not include this power."" In cases where the courts apply a liability rule as a property owner's remedy-in other words, disregard the "right to keep" or at least marginalize it to a right with
only a damages remedy to owners-the courts "[take] away their
power to refuse to sell their rights . . . thereby undermining their status as owners."' Bell and Parchomovsky reach a similar conclusion
that "the probability of retention and the use value are variables that
positively correlate with the owner's utility."9 7
Thus, if owners equate status with the right to refuse, they will
place a separate value on their "right to keep." Rachlinski and
Jourden explain, "an important component of [the endowment effect]
might be that ownership usually includes the ability to refuse to sell
a possession.9 8 "In other words, the endowment effect might depend
upon whether the law protects an ownership interest with a property
rule or a liability rule."99 Similarly, they explain that the right to refuse to sell-in other words, a right governed by a property rule and
enforceable by an injunction-gives owners (and those to whom they
might transfer the property who will receive the same rights package) a sense of certainty that adds value to the property. Presumably,
purchasers in a free exchange who wish to obtain the same level of
certainty will pay more for property that comes with that additional
characteristic. 00 For this reason, Bell and Parchomovsky explain
their preference for property rules; they argue "property rule protection enables the entitlement holder to set the price at which the item
will be used or transferred. A fortiori, it also empowers the holder to
refuse to deal altogether and keep the object."' 0
These concepts surrounding the "right to keep" justify its recognition and value; they are reflected in court opinions and legal com94.

Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 74, at 1542.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97.

Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 554.

98. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 74, at 1545 ("The remedy is likely to have a
strong influence on the size of the endowment effect. A right that is protected by a damages
remedy might convey less of a sense of ownership than does a right that is protected by an
injunctive remedy."). Id. at 1560.

99. Id. at 1545.
100. Id. at 1560 (rights protected by damages remedies alone have a "potential for interference [that] undermines the certainty that an injunctive remedy conveys. . . . Injunctive remedies convey a sense of certainty and security that damages remedies do not.").
101. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 589 ("Property rule enforcement
is therefore instrumental in the blocking of nonconsensual takings that may substantially
deplete the value assets generate for their owners.").

2018]

THE KEEPINGS CLAUSE

1051

mentary, but not always with express mention of a "right to keep,"
"right to retain," or "right to refuse to sell." Nonetheless, a few
sources have directly invoked these terms from time to time. The
next two Sections survey many of the places where these terms are
expressly employed.
B. The "Right to Keep" or "Right to Retain" in Court Opinions:An
Obvious Stick in the Bundle with a Surprisingly Small Set of Cases
Discussing It
There is strikingly little attention given to the phrase "right to
keep" in the literature or case law on property generally, or on takings particularly, notwithstanding the fact that protecting owners'
ability to keep property rests at the foundation and in the background of the development of many legal rules. 0 2 This Section looks
at case citations to these concepts.
Although the phrase "right to keep" or "right to retain" has been
recognized in the substance of many judicial dispositions, surprisingly, these words have been expressly used in only a small number of
opinions.'0 3 No doubt, the ideas and concepts associated with keeping
or retaining property are often part of the discussion in takings cases,
but the "right to retain" or "right to keep" often lurks in the background of these opinions rather than being directly discussed.
As mentioned in this Article's introduction, the "right to retain" has
been expressly mentioned in the most recent takings decision by the
Court in Murr v. Wisconsin, and the "right to retain" language expressly appeared also in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.10 4 A New York state court succinctly pronounced in 1953
that, "An individual under our constitution has always been guaranteed the right to retain his property unless the Legislature felt the
public interest to be paramount." 0 5 One federal district court explained that an owner has "a right to retain his exclusive claim to the
property" and that right will be presumed to be constant and something "which can only be taken from him under the power of eminent

102. See Kochan, Keepings, supra note 80 (describing the prevalence of rules in the
property system that are designed to help owners keep what they own).
103. See, e.g., Kansas ex rel. St. Joseph & Denver City R. Co. v. Nemaha Cty. Comm'rs, 7
Kan. 542, 546 (1871) ('Every person has a vested right to retain his own property for his own
use, subject to the right of taxation for public use, and to the right of eminent domain, neither
of which is called into requisition, so far as any question in this case is concerned.").

104. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017); Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 704, 734 (2010).
105. Tucci v. Giarrusso, 123 N.Y.S.2d 238, 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
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domain."'o In other words, the court was explaining that, even if a
portion of property is taken for the public good, the presumption toward retention plays a role. Whatever was not taken or is not necessary for the public use remains with the property owner.' 7o
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in a 2007 case, explained the role
of "the right to keep" in commanding narrow interpretations of the
condemnation power-" [b]ecause the power to condemn private property is in derogation of the right to own and keep property, the exceptions in art. II, section 14 must be interpreted narrowly, with any
uncertainty in the ambit of the power to condemn resolved against
the person asserting that power."'08 A longstanding line of Colorado
cases use this "right to own and keep property" language.' 09
In one takings case, the Michigan Supreme Court stressed the autonomy of individuals to use their property as they wish, with the
"right to keep" being a default rule that could only be overcome by
compensation. In the 1889 case of City of Detroit v. Beecher, the court
explained: "What he intends to do with this land, if certain contingencies occur, is not material. He has a right to keep his property, or
to receive full compensation for it if it is taken on the ground of public necessity.""10
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has made a very strong pronouncement about the "right to keep" in its 1917 opinion in
Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick."' The context of the court's
inquiry surrounded the issue of whether an easement holder's rights
could be extinguished-against the will of the easement holder-"for
the benefit of the servient estate upon the payment of money."" The
court emphasized that the existence of compensation should not end
the matter-money does not always cleanse an otherwise forceful and
illegitimate extinguishment of one's property rights.113
106. United States v. Prop. on Pinto Island, 74 F. Supp. 92, 102 (S.D. Ala. 1947), rev'd
sub nom. United States v. Turner, 175 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1949).
107. See, e.g., Hudson v. City of Shawnee, 790 P.2d 933, 940 (Kan. 1990) ("The landowner retains the right to use condemned property for any purpose not inconsistent with

the public right." (citing Kan. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Winn, 605 P.2d 125 (Kan. 1980))); Thompson v. City of Osage, 421 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Iowa 1988) ("Although the condemnor is entitled to exclusive use of the land condemned, the owner retains the right to use the property
for any purpose not inconsistent with the public right.").

108.
109.

Akin v. Four Corners Encampment, 179 P.3d 139, 144 (Colo. App. 2007).
See, e.g., Town of Eaton v. Bouslog, 292 P.2d 343, 344 (Col. 1956) (en banc) (em-

phasis added).

110. City of Detroit v. Beecher, 42 N.W. 986, 991 (Mich. 1889) (emphasis added).
111. 117 N.E. 244 (Mass. 1917).
112. Id. at 249.
113. Id. at 246 ("If the use for which the property is taken is not public, it is of no consequence that ample provision is made for compensation to the owner.").
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The court in Riverbank Improvement Co. also explained that it did
not matter if, objectively, it could be proven that the owner would be
better off with compensation than retaining control of the easement
property." 4 The court exclaimed that the purpose of the property protections found in the "[T]akings [C]1ause" in Massachusetts' Constitution is grounded in a "right to keep," without others deciding what
is best for the owner or insisting that one coercively part with her
property simply because she is paid:
By article 10 of the Bill of Rights of the [Massachusetts] Constitution, the right is guaranteed to 'each individual of the society' 'to be
protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property,
according to standing laws.' In the continued enjoyment of these
three rights when defined and established by law the individual is
not obliged to submit to the judgment of court or Legislature that
he ought to hand them over for compensation to some one or more
of his fellows in their private interest. He is secure under the Constitution in his right to keep what is his own, even though another
wants it for private uses and may be willing to pay more than its
value."

The protection of property rights necessitates protecting the owner's
control over whether, and by what means, those property rights are
disposed.
In 1974, the Indiana Supreme Court cited the Riverbank Improvement Co. case favorably in Pulos v. James,"' stressing that the

burden for justifying the taking of property against the will of the
owner is extremely high." 7 Property rights in the nature of real estate, the court explained, are "different in kind" from other types of
deprivations, and money damages cannot always be considered an
adequate substitute for the extinguishment of the rights because
such property rights include an owner's "right to keep what is his

114. Id. ("It may be that it would be wiser for the respondents to receive money damages and submit to the extinguishment of their other property right. But that fact, if it be a
fact, is wholly irrelevant.").
115. Id. at 246 (emphasis added); see also Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 920
(Mass. 1974) (Quirico, J., dissenting) (quoting the "right to keep" language from Riverbank
Improvement Co. in arguing that the court should have found a defect in the condemnation
at issue because of a "total absence of . . public use"; an incidental benefit for the public or
the "public interest" is not enough to justify a taking).
116. 302 N.E.2d 768, 774 (Ind. 1973) (quoting the holding in Riverbank Improvement
Co., including its language on the "right to keep what is his own").
117. Id. ("It was said in Atty. Gen. v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 480 . . : 'If the statute is
merely for the benefit of individual property owners, the purpose does not justify the taking
of a right in land against the will of the owner.' (emphasis ours) []That principle is precisely
applicable to the statute at bar. If the use for which the property is taken is not public, it is
of no consequence that ample provision is made for compensation to the owner.").
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own.""s This means any compensation award is an imperfect substitute for allowing the owner to keep the property and consume its value for herself. The Indiana Supreme Court returned to its Pulos
precedent again in 1990, making a statement in Clem v. Christole,
Inc., that "a property owner 'is secure under the Constitution in his
right to keep what is his own, even though another wants it for private uses.'"no
While there is no doubt that one can find countless property rights
and takings cases which might allude to concepts related to the "right
to keep" idea, the cases discussed above largely exhaust the available
reported cases to use the specific phrase "right to keep" or "right to retain" as used in this property rights context. Surely, it is an effusive
concept, but one with unjustifiably restrained specific articulation.
C. A Few Notes on the "Right to Keep" or "Right to Retain" in
Academic Literature
A similar scarcity of the use of the phrases "right to keep" or "right
to retain" exists in the scholarly literature on property rights. References to the exact phrase "right to keep" are sparse in the literature,
but one can find a few examples. Singer has notably posited that "[a]
corollary of the right to exclude is the right to keep your property.
Others cannot take your property away from you without your consent no matter how much they want it." 2 0 Of course, Singer follows
this observation with an analysis on why there "have always been
exceptions to this principle," and many legal doctrines have emerged
that constrain owner's rights-doctrines that, he explains, serve as
"traditional limitations on the right to keep what one owns."1 2 ' Richard Epstein, too, has used the phrase when discussing the unconstitutional conditions theory and recognizes the importance of voluntary
exchange, explaining his view that "[p]ersons have a constitutional
right to keep property, yet they surrender it all the time in order to
118. Id. at 773-74 ("A property right in the nature of real estate incident to the ownership of land, even though it cannot be enforced specifically in equity, is a property right
different in kind from money damages assessed for the extinguishment of that property

right.").
119. Clem v. Christole, Inc., 548 N.E.2d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 1990) (citing favorably Pulos
v. James).
120.

Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.

1369, 1395 (2013).
121. Id. ("Owners have long lost their property by adverse possession and eminent
domain and equitable doctrines have conferred informally-created rights to property
through doctrines like easement by estoppel, necessity, and implication, and exceptions to
the statute of frauds such as the part performance doctrine. The law of mortgages emerged
when the equity courts granted borrowers relief from the strict rules of the law courts,
denying lenders their contractually-established rights to possession.").
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obtain alternative goods that they value more highly."' 2 Frank
Michelman briefly ponders, in a 2016 article, whether the "right to
keep" might exist and have particular consequences for our understanding of eminent domain.1 23 In doing so, he does not himself draw
any strong conclusions, but he does acknowledge the dearth of literature on the subjects of the existence and meaning of the "right to
keep."124

Anita Bernstein has observed the existence of the "right to keep"
and its limitations, explaining that "[u]nder the contemporary rule of
law everywhere, the right to keep one's property exists, but is partially defeasible."' 2 5 Boudewijn Bouckaert has opined that "the Spanish

Jesuit Vazquez and the French jurists Francois Hotman and Hugues
Donneau ... define property as the right to keep a good, to use it, to
benefit from its yields, to exclude anybody else from its use, to alienate it, and even to destroy it."'"2 Another author has explained a per-

ception during English colonization to be that "[t]he basic legal protection afforded to the free Englishman was the right to keep his own
property" when describing the struggles by early settlers in the West
Indies to secure "the rights of Englishmen."' 2 7 Robert McNamara has

opined that a public hearing process and some kind of adversarial
proceeding in eminent domain cases is necessary because the question asking "whether it would be legal to use eminent domain in the
given circumstances" is "the question that determines a property
owner s legal right to keep her property."2
Much of the literature that uses the phrase "right to keep" focuses
on the positive right to affirmative protection from losing something
one owns, such as through forfeiture or foreclosure-as contrasted
with the negative right against interference with one's ability to
keep, which is the principal focus on this Article. Nonetheless, it is
122. Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48 (1988); see also Amy L. Peikoff, Beyond Reductionism:
Reconsidering the Right to Privacy, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 10 (2008) (explaining from
the objectivism perspective that "the right to property includes the right to keep those
things that one has produced or acquired . . . .").
123. Frank I. Michelman, Good Government, Core Liberties, and ConstitutionalProperty: An Essay for Joe Singer, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 27 (2016).
124. Id.
125. Anita Bernstein, Question Autonomy, With an Asterisk, 54 EMORY L.J. 239, 245
(2005).
126. Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 775 (1990)
(emphasis added). Bouckaert cautioned though that "[t]his is not to say that these jurists
propagated a liberal, individualist property system." Id.
127. Liam S6amus O'Melinn, Note, The American Revolution and Constitutionalismin
the Seventeenth-Century West Indies, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 115 (1995).
128. Robert McNamara, Stacking the Deck: New York's Unique Approach to Eminent
Domain, 4 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 286, 291 (2011).
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worthwhile to look at some instances of this type of positive rights
usage.
Audrey McFarlane, for example, has quite an extensive use of the
phrase, "' although not always in the same manner as this Article
intends. In a 2011 article, McFarlane counsels that we "should begin
to pay attention to an under-theorized stick in the bundle of property
rights: 'the right to keep.' "130 In her primary work on the concept,
however, McFarlane focuses on owners keeping their property
against others who might have a legal claim to it, largely focusing on
predatory private behaviors that result in an owner being dispossessed of property.131
She claims that an owner should have a "right to keep" that is capable of being asserted against others seemingly engaged in predatory
behavior (for example, lenders). "In order to rebut this predatory behavior," McFarlane asserts, "we need to theorize a more precise and
robust notion of an under-theorized stick in the metaphorical bundle of
property rights: the right to be free from expropriation." 3 2 Then, she
explains, "[b]uilding on the existing but underdeveloped recognition of
this stick allows us to consider when and where and under what circumstances a property owner should have a protected 'right to keep'
their land." 3 3 McFarlane further explains that her "right to keep" is
associated with a "right to be free from [exploitation]," which she finds
to be of broad concern in the property sphere.1 3 4 She certainly does not
approach the idea of the "right to keep" from the same classical liberal
viewpoint presented in this Article.
In this Article, I do not intend to analyze or comment on this particular formulation of a "right to keep" as articulated by McFarlane.
Nonetheless, McFarlane's work includes some valuable discussions
regarding the underlying assumptions about what it means to have a
"right to keep" one's property-regardless of the debate over when
the "right to keep" should be actionable or to whom it can be asserted
against. For example, she highlights the facilitation of stability and
predictability as important consequences of the confidence one gets
when she believes that she has the ability to assert a "right to keep"
against would-be takers.1 35 This is a consequence of relevance to this
129. Audrey G. McFarlane, The Propertiesof Instability: Markets, Predation,Racialized
Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855 [hereinafter McFarlane, Instability].
130. Id. at 855.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 861.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 867. "[L]egal enforcement of property rights should increase the property
owner's probability of retaining possession of her property . . . . The heightened protection
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Article's thesis as well. "Perhaps the key component of the utility of
stability's predictability," she counsels, "is the ability to retain ownership as long as the property owner desires." 3 6
The relationship between an owner's "right to keep" and the ability to resist being dispossessed certainly exists as a concern in governmental takings. Therefore, when McFarlane discusses similar
dispossession from predatory lenders, again the values expressed in
the "right to keep" are instructive to this Article's application of the
retention concept. In fact, it is notable that, in a separate 2009 article, McFarlane remarked that "[e]minent domain involves the claim
of taking the right to keep one's property." 3 7 In her 2011 article,
McFarlane similarly explains characteristics of ownership that
should be implicated in both positive-rights and negative-rights settings-"ownership explicitly promises or suggests a right not to be
unwarrantedly dispossessed," and we must recognize the need to give
"attention to the factors that contribute to interfering with one's ability to retain possession of one's property." 3 8
McFarlane's policy prescriptions include restrictions on alienability
of property and limits on private transactions that are beyond the scope
of this Article.1 3 9 However, she nonetheless makes a persuasive case
that stability in investment of property requires governmental recognition of, and willingness to protect, the "right to keep."1 4 0 Essential to
McFarlane's understanding is that "a right to keep is . . an implied yet
necessary aspect of all of the other sticks in the bundle .... The ability
to continue to own property until one is ready to part with it reflects and
maintains fair and sustainable social relations among people."'41
The "right to keep" solidifies the notion that an owner will only
part with her property when willing to do so and only upon terms ac-

effected by legal enforcement makes it less likely that current owners would involuntarily
lose their assets." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomov-

sky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 555 (2005)).
136.

McFarlane, Instability, supra note 129, at 867.

137. Audrey G. McFarlane, Rebuilding the Public-Private City: Regulatory Taking's
Anti-SubordinationInsights for Eminent Domain and Redevelopment, 42 IND. L. REV. 97,

142 (2009).
138.

McFarlane, Instability, supra note 129, at 868.

139. Id. at 916 ("This right to keep could be secured by legislation, but also should be
explored by critically examining ways for the courts to use common law equitable principles to refuse to recognize transactions and instruments that involve exploitation and develop robust notions of quasi-fraud.").
140. Id. at 869 ("[T]he central value and assumption of stability in any country desiring
investment is that if an 'owner' is unlawfully dispossessed, the system will, in theory at
least, reinstate you.").

141. Id. at 927.
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ceptable to her as owner. 4 2 That assurance of one's ability to keep
property helps to facilitate bargaining. The law's recognition of such
keeping rights makes property more valuable and thereby encourages trade and investment in property because the law sets rules
that create a respect for property rights and "protect[] private expectations to ensure private investment." 4 3 The discussion of these and
other features of the "right to keep," including its presence at the
foundation of the Fifth Amendments' protections and limitations on
power, is expanded upon below.
IV.

TAKINGS VERSUS KEEPINGS: EXAMINING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

When we think of the provisions in the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution (or an equivalent provision in a state constitution)
that deal with allocating the division between power and rights over
private property and eminent domain, we usually refer to the provision stating, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,"' 4 4 as the "Takings Clause." The so-called
"Takings Clause" is more about keeping than it is about taking. This
Part will examine each provision of the Fifth Amendment relevant to
when property is taken, showing that the details and structure of
such provisions are designed to reinforce owners' rights to keep what
they own.
A breakdown of the relevant words is instructive. "[N]or" is an indication of prohibition and sets the tone that the clause's primary
purpose is to serve a power-limiting (rather than power-conferring or
power-legitimizing) function. "[S]hall" connotes that the limitations
on power that follow are mandatory, and the government is obligated
to adhere to them. "[P]rivate property" is the scope of protected interests. "Shall [not] be taken" refers to the act of property being "taken"
that triggers coverage of the provision and the subject of actions to
which the limitations apply. "[F]or public use" is the "property rule,"
meaning owners have a right to exclude the government if the taking
is for anything other than a public use. Lastly, "without just compensation" is the "liability rule" meaning that, if the government has
cleared the threshold hurdle of establishing that its exercise of power
will be for a public use, then the property owner does not have a right
to exclude the government for public use takings so long as the government compensates justly. To round out our terminology, "eminent

142. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 540 ("Exclusion preserves owners'
idiosyncratic values and bargaining position.").
143. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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domain" is the power in question; "condemnation" is the exercise of
that power; and "takings" are the effect of the exercise of the power.
Thus, if we call this collection of words a "Takings Clause," we are
describing the limitation on eminent domain by its exercise and adverse effects on rights, rather than describing the rights to be protected by restraint in the exercise of eminent domain. In so defining
the clause by the types of acts it seeks to restrain rather than by the
effects of restraint and the nature of the rights protected, we are also
tacitly creating a presumption favoring takings. The label makes the
critical reference point the power. When one calls something the
"Takings Clause," it sounds more in the nature of conferring a power
rather than constraining authority or recognizing a right.'4 5 For that
reason, "Keepings Clause" is at least one possible superior moniker in
the sense that it conveys information about the rights to be protected
rather than seeming to validate a power that, in the letter and spirit
of the clause, is meant to be exercised sparingly. The critical reference point shifts to the right protected.
This Part provides a basic introduction to this understanding of
the Fifth Amendment as structured to protect the "right to keep." As
the Colorado Supreme Court stated in a 1956 opinion in Town of
Eaton v. Bouslog, for example, when discussing the relationship between the eminent domain power to take private property with the
keepings rights held by the private property owners to be dispossessed, "[t]he authority to exercise such power [to condemn private
lands], being against the common right to own and keep property,
must be given expressly or by clear implication; it can never be implied from doubtful language." 4 6 Owners and purchasers expect that
the government will respect that ownership, will not confiscate property once acquired or expropriate investments once made, and will
not otherwise disrupt or interfere with the sanctity or enforceability
of the exchange.1 4 7
The Framers of the Constitution structured a government of limited powers-with the essential purpose of protecting private proper-

145. At least when individuals call it the "Eminent Domain Clause," for example, the
label for the Clause is a category of powers to be affected. Still, that label lacks the pronouncement of the limitations on eminent domain inside the Clause. Nevertheless, this
"Eminent Domain Clause" alternative is at least somewhat value-neutral because it identifies the category to be considered.
146. Town of Eaton v. Bouslog, 292 P.2d 343, 344 (Colo. 1956) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
147. Heather K. Way, Informal Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29
ST. LOUIs U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 121 (2009) ("Security in ownership-the principle that an
owner's property rights cannot be taken away, except by the government with just compensation-is a fundamental attribute of American property ownership.").
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ty.1 48 They were no doubt inspired by John Locke's contention that
"[t]he great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation
of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things
wanting." 49 James Madison acknowledged the same necessity of the
state to protect property and the need for owners to have their property protected from the state. In his essay, Property, Madison wrote,
"[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort . . . . This
being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which
50
impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own."o
Thus, "protection" and "preservation," not merely "compensation," must be the
focus in constitutional interpretation of what it means to adhere to just
governance.
Constitutional safeguards to protect against the temptations toward abuse of power were embedded in the governmental structure
in a variety of ways, including being placed in the Fifth Amendment.
James Madison, in the famous "if men were angels" passage of The
Federalist No. 51, observed the necessity of governmental accountability when he wrote:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controuls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the neces'

sity of auxiliary precautions.' 5

The Fifth Amendment is a prime exemplar of this balance, guaranteeing rights to check the eminent domain power. The government is
given the power to take property for public use when it is necessary

148. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 29 (1985); see also Robert Brauneis, Eastern Enterprises, Phillips, Money, and the Limited Role of the Just Compensation Clause in Protecting Property "in its
Larger and Juster Meaning," 51 ALA. L. REV. 937, 939 (2000) ("We all know that the prevailing view of the founding generation was that, as Gouverneur Morris, echoing Locke and
others, put it at the Constitutional Convention, 'property [is] the main object of [s]ociety.'"
(citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533 (Max Farrand ed.
1911))).
149. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 66 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690).
150. James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
151.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
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to control the governed, but it is obliged to control itself by taking
only for public use and only upon compensating property owners
harmed by its actions.
The power of eminent domain was seen at the Founding as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, and the Constitution is meant as a
means to control it. 2 In particular, the Fifth Amendment provisions
inserted in the Bill of Rights were a means to constrain that sovereign power-in other words, to stress the counterbalancing rights
individuals have vis-A-vis that power.1 5 3 As stated before, it is odd
that we have chosen (mind you, only relatively recently) to label a
rights provision-that is specifically designed to control powers that
the Founders felt were ideal candidates for abuse unless checkedwith a name based on the powers meant to be controlled. The frame
is upside down and inside out.
Given its placement in the Bill of Rights and its purpose to guarantee that rights constrain powers,1 54 it is appropriate to focus on
what rights the Fifth Amendment meant to protect. Once we do so, it
is clear that there is a relationship between the substance of those
rights in the Constitution and what this Article has been calling the
"right to keep."
As mentioned earlier, the provisions governing eminent domain in
the Fifth Amendment include a "property rule" component and a "liability rule" component. Although we think of property rules and liability rules in the traditional structure delineated by Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed in their seminal work,15 5 Epstein is correct to
point out that what most term the "Takings Clause" does not operate
within these clean theoretical constructs. It involves components of a

"

152. We should remember that the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution helps mold a
frame when it states that the document is intended to "secure the blessings of liberty." U.S.
CONST. pmbl.
153. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 148, at 29 ("It is very clear that the founders
shared Locke's and Blackstone's affection for private property, which is why they inserted
the eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights.").
154. See Tonja Jacobi, Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Creating a Self-Stabilizing
Constitution: The Role of the Takings Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 601, 620 (2015) ("[U]sing
language that closely corresponds to the logic of focal points, Madison conceded that declarations of rights 'have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish
the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community.'
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 31, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 372, 382 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904), available at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1937 [https://perma.cc/ZC7F-4SE])).
155. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 604 (describing how the Calabresi and Melamed
property-rules/liability-rules framework applies to the takings provisions of the Fifth
Amendment).
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property rule (the "Public Use Clause") and a liability rule (the "Just
Compensation Clause"), but both also operate within an overall governance system that includes "institutional structures and safeguards" that even further constrain the governmental power.16 This
means that analysis of the rules and compliance with them cannot
stop at simply calculating which type of rule is more efficient.'
Together, all of the conferrals, power limitations, and institutional-structure restraints on rights were designed to minimize the occurrence of takings by (1) constraining the scope of available purposes for seizing property, and (2) creating financial, institutional, and
electoral consequences for those that acted ultra vires or otherwise
overused the eminent domain power. As Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky explain generally, regarding protecting assets from
forced transfers, "legal enforcement of property rights is designed to
keep assets in the hands of legally recognized owners by deterring
nonconsensual takings by making them prohibitively costly."
The Fifth Amendment provisions regarding takings, then, should
be seen as principally conferring, or recognizing, two distinct rights
that help accomplish this restraint on the occurrence of takings. The
first is housed in the words "public use," which gives individuals a
right to exclude the government entirely if a use is for something
other than a public one.1'5 To use the terminology by Calabresi and
60
Melamed,o
this is the "property rule" component of the takings protections. The "public use" provision concerns preserving one's "right
to keep" her property (at least against certain kinds of governmental
demands) no matter what level of compensation is offered.16' The
"Public Use Clause" establishes a property rule precisely because, if a
taking is for anything other than a public use, then consent is required and surrendering one's property for compensation, no matter

156. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2114 (1997).
157. Id.
158. Bell and Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 571.
159. For a detailed discussion of the "Public Use Clause," see Donald J. Kochan, "Public
Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49 (1998).
160. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 155.
161. See Lia Sprague, Note, Kelo v. City of New London, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 389
(2006) (without elaborating, this note very briefly identifies the connection when stating
that "the public policy benefit favoring governmental takings needs to be balanced against
the public policy favoring a citizen's right to keep his property. With this in mind, the
Framers added the Public Use Clause . . . ."). But see Nadia E. Nedzel, Reviving Protection
for Private Property:A PracticalApproach to Blight Takings, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 995,
1017 (contending that "[w]hat individuals really want, even more than the right to keep
their property, is fair proceedings and just compensation.").
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how large, cannot be compelled. 6 2 The "right to keep" is the presumption and the public use clause establishes the (intended) high bar for
rebutting it.
The second right is housed in the words "just compensation,"
which guarantees that individuals who must sacrifice their rights to
a public use are made as whole as possible. To the extent that the
government does take private property, owners at least have their
keepings rights compensated. With such takings, the government
must admit that, but for its actions, the owner would have the "right
to keep" the property, and that the owner is therefore entitled to the
value of the property as compensation for the taking. This latter
right is best described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Armstrong v.
United States: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole." 6 3 The just compensation guarantee
is the "liability rule" component of the takings protections. If a taking
is for a proper end, then the owner cannot prevent the taking, but
they can demand payment. The public then, as a whole, bears the
burden by compensating an owner who has lost her "right to keep" so
that she is not required to alone sacrifice her rights to serve the public need.
Both rights-the exclusion right from the "public use" limitation
and the damages right from the "just compensation" limitation-can
be seen as reinforcing what Wesley Hohfeld would describe as immunity rights associated with ownership. In Hohfeld's seminal work
on the nature of rights, he sought to refine and distinguish the core
elements of rights, privileges, immunities, and liabilities.1 64 Hohfeld
explained that an immunity is the freedom from the control of another, which can be analogized to the freedom that an owner has from
the attempt by others to take that ownership away. Hohfeld sets out
the definitions and distinctions as follows:
[A] power bears the same general contrast to an immunity that a
right does to a privilege. A right is one's affirmative claim against
another, and a privilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of
162. Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 156, at 2112-13 (describing the traditional view
of the "Public Use Clause" as a restraint on government power fashioned as a property
rule, so that "where the taking is not for a public use (whatever its precise content) then
the individual property owner is once again protected by a property right, so that what can
be taken can only be taken with consent").
163. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
164. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913-1914).
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another. Similarly, a power is one's affirmative "control" over a
given legal relation as against another; whereas an immunity is
one's freedom from the legal power or "control" of another as regards some legal relation. 161

To see the connection between the "right to keep" and Hohfeld's definition of immunities, it is useful to follow the examples Hohfeld provides. Consider the first example:
X, a landowner, has, as we have seen, power to alienate to Y or to
any other ordinary party. On the other hand, X has also various
immunities as against Y, and all other ordinary parties. For Y is
under a disability (i.e., has no power) so far as shifting the legal interest either to himself or to a third party is concerned; and what is
true of Y applies similarly to every one else who has not by virtue of
special operative facts acquired a power to alienate X's property. 6 6

In identifying the owner's control over alienability and all others'
lack of power (or disability) to take away (or shift) that interest to
anyone else, Hohfeld claims that the owner is thereby usually the
holder of immunities against all others. These immunities are freedoms from the actions, wants, or demands of others-including from
others' attempts to take property away from the owner. The consequences of these immunities and owner controls over alienability can
be characterized as a generally-held "right to keep" one's property
(even though Hohfeld does not use those terms). This is why Singer
posits that the "right to keep" one's property should be characterized
as "an example of what Wesley Hohfeld called an 'immunity' right"which, as previously described, is a type of right that entitles its
holder to be immune from the demands (or claims) made by others
concerning his property, regardless of whether those demands are to
control how the property is used or to demand that ownership be given over altogether to the demander, including the government. 6 1
So long as someone has not lost their immunity in some way, they
have the "right to keep" their property. The rest of the world is under
a disability vis-A-vis that property and can normally only overcome
that disability through voluntary exchange and consensual trading of
rights. The various rules supporting the "right to keep" in our laws
assign these immunities and disabilities between owners and "others" that give us a baseline against which bargaining over the property can occur.
Of course, eminent domain anticipates occasional coercion and
transfers of property outside normal consensual bargaining condi165.

Id. at 55.

166.

Id.

167.

SINGER, supra note 82, §4.1.
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tions. Applying the "Hohfeldean" understanding of immunities and
disabilities to the property provisions in the Fifth Amendment reveals important insights on how those rights-to be free from takings
for private use and to just compensation for takings for public useboth stem from the meta "right to keep." The government is always
at a disability from exercising eminent domain power to coercively
seize the property of an otherwise lawfully possessing private owner
for anything other than a public use. The owner has an absolute immunity in that sense and, consequently, can enforce it through injunctive relief. The government is also at a disability even for takings
for justifiable public use ends unless and until it pays just compensation. Unless and until it does, the property owner retains the immunity. Once the government establishes a public use as the ends for the
taking and pays just compensation, however, the parties' positions
shift. The government has used the liability rule portion of the Fifth
Amendment to escape its disability and transformed the owner's immunity into only a right to damages for what is essentially a lawfully-authorized sovereign confiscation of the immunity right. 6 8
The frame "Takings Clause" implies that takings are the norm
rather than the exception. When we focus too much on the liability
rule components of the "Takings Clause," we risk encouraging more
force.'6 9 Eric Claeys explains that "[1]iability rules, as construed by
70
law and economics scholars, legitimate forced transfers of rights."
Thus, when the "Takings Clause" terminology reinforces the legitimacy of an essentially unconstrained liability rule vision for Fifth
Amendment protections, we start to lose the deterrent effect that
should come with viewing the "Takings Clause" as the "Keepings
Clause," with a rebuttable presumption that coerced transfers are
illegitimate. After all, the takings provisions in the Fifth Amendment
are anomalous; in the ordinary course of affairs outside of it,
"[t]raditionally, rights such as the ownership of real property are

168. But see John Harrison, Immunity Rules 7-9 (VA. PUB. L. AND LEGAL THEORY RES.
PAPER SERIES, No. 2017-07, Feb. 16, 2017, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED
MAJOR WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Balganesh et al.

eds., 2018) (forthcoming 2018), at 7-8, 14, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2918975 [https://perma.cc/8GA9-G759] (providing a slightly different interpretation of how "Hohfeldean" immunities interact with the just compensation
provisions of the Fifth Amendment).
169. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 871, 873 (2007) ("Undercompensation is . .
unfair because it deprives property owners of part of the value of the property taken," and it is inefficient because "undercompensation may induce excessive takings because it allows the government to ignore part of the

cost it imposes on private property owners through its land use policies.").
170. Eric R. Claeys, The Right to Exclude in the Shadow of the Cathedral:A Response
to Parchomousky and Stein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 391, 396 (2010) (emphasis added).
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generally protected by injunctions, while tort and contract rights are
enforced by means of compensatory damages."' 7
Exclusion is critical to property rights because it protects the owner's ability to refuse to sell except for the price that makes her whole;
this "reserve price" may very well be higher than the fair market
value typically offered as just compensation for coerced transfers like
those effected through eminent domain. 7 2 To retain the value of the
"right to keep" in any transaction transferring the property, an owner
must be able to set the price for the property in a manner that includes her own subjective value of the property.7 3 Bell and Parchomovsky posit that "[t]hese gaps between reserve and market prices should be widely observed, and the value reflected by the higher
reserve price can often be protected only by an in rem right that includes the right to exclude nonconsensual users."1 7 4 This problem of
undercompensation is discussed further in Part VI.C.
As to the scope of "public use," one of the reasons why we do not
talk about what is called the "Takings Clause" as the "Keepings
Clause"-or at least why we do not more often explore the idea of a
"right to keep" at the foundation of that clause-might be because the
courts have abandoned any role as guardians of this "Public Use
Clause," which acts as the strongest keepings vehicle in the Fifth
Amendment. The judicial failure to observe such a frame for these
rights is perhaps most visibly evidenced by the 2005 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London.7 5
The government cannot take for the purely private use of another.' 7 6 There is little debate on that point, even in the words of the Kelo opinion. Very few would claim a greater utilitarian role for the eminent domain power. However, despite relatively universal agreement on the existence of the limitation, there are strong constraint
versions and weak constraint versions of interpretation of the "Public

171.

Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern

Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786 (2007).
172. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 587 ("Often, owners develop sentimental relationships with assets protected by property rights, such that their 'reserve
price' (the price at which they would be willing to sell the object) is substantially in excess
of the market price.").
173. Id. ("An important aspect of the value enabled by the right to exclude is sentimental or other idiosyncratic value not reflected in the market price.").

174. Id.
175. 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
176. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."); MICH. CONST. ART. X, § 2 ("Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation therefore first being made or secured in a
manner prescribed by law."); see also Kochan, "Public Use,"supra note 159, at 49 n.5 (1998)
(footnote discussing the "Public Use Clauses" in state constitutions).
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Use Clause." Over the years, courts have more often than not adopted an interpretation of "public use" that supports the weak version,
and very few governmental actions have been deemed outside the
public use constitutional limit. This has been accomplished due to
two major facets of the "public use" jurisprudence. First, modern
courts, on a regular basis, have expansively interpreted the scope of
what counts as a "public" use. Second, the courts have regularly
adopted a position of deference to the legislature to decide what is a
"public use" (or, as accepted within the definition of that term, a public benefit or in-service-of-the-public-good result and thereby a legitimate exercise of eminent domain). Not surprisingly, the legislature
usually believes that the state action in question does indeed serve
those public goals, thus leaving little room for courts to check the
power.
The now (in)famous Kelo decision'7 7 provides some insights on
these points. In Kelo, the U.S. Supreme Court explained: "Without
exception, our cases have defined [public use] broadly, reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field," 7 8 and "[flor more than a century, our public use jurisprudence
has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of
affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public
needs justify the use of the takings power."' 7 9 Finally, the Court
broadly stated that: "Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public
purpose," and "[q]uite simply, the government's pursuit of a public
purpose will often benefit individual private parties."' 8 0Each of those
statements illustrates that, while the "Public Use Clause" might operate as a property rule that protects the "right to keep" in theory,
the weak judicial oversight makes enforcement of the property rule
less likely.
Coupled with a frame that actually encourages takings rather
than a frame that helps support a presumption of constraint-a presumption that owners should be allowed to keep rather than that the
government should be allowed to take-this lack of judicial examination is especially dangerous.' 8 ' In fact, the Kelo Court even seemed to
177. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (2005).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 483.
180. Id. at 485.
181. Although the full extent of the impacts from a relatively toothless "public use"
doctrine are largely beyond the scope of this Article, one such impact-a disproportionate
loss of rights for the poor-should receive mention. As Carol Brown notes, "[t]he exercise of
eminent domain in the United States has victimized politically disadvantaged groups like
minorities and the poor the most," making the protection of constitutional property rights
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recognize that something more was needed to protect property rights
in light of its interpretation. For example, the Court cited amici who
"raise[d] questions about the fairness of the measure of just compensation" 82 when going out of its way to state that "[i]n affirming the
City's authority to take petitioners' properties, we do not minimize
the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the
payment of just compensation." 8 3 There, the Court acknowledged the
limitations of its powers to consider such possibilities for unfairness
when interpreting the scope of "public use," largely because it felt
constrained by precedent on the "Public Use Clause. 8 4 The Court
even invited the states to increase the protective floor if they wished
to provide greater property rights protections."
Anything that steers us toward restraint and a preference for negotiated bargaining rather than forced transfers should be encouraged. Any structure or ethos that leads to a keepings-presumptive
mentality rather than a takings-presumptive one is particularly important in light of the practical flaws seen in the "Just Compensation
Clause" and "Public Use Clause" components of the larger Fifth
Amendment property protection. First, just compensation often fails
to fully make individual owners whole because fair market values do
not account for individualized values lost as a result of the inability
to refuse to sell." Second, the "public use" constraint has become
highly diluted as the courts increasingly recognize an almost unlimited scope of acceptable purposes for which exercises of eminent domain will be deemed legitimate.' 87
Beyond expanding the protective floor through state constitutional
protections as the Court suggested in Kelo, we might find other ways
to change the narrative around takings. We might alter the frame so

perhaps most important to these groups because they have less access to political power to
protect their interests; for these groups, a narrow definition of "public use" that might be
generated from a shift in thinking from takings to keeping would be particularly important. Carol Necole Brown, Justice Thomas's Kelo Dissent: The Perilous and Political

Nature of Public Purpose, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 273, 273, 281 (2016) (citing often Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506-21 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting)).
182. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.21.
183. Id. at 489-90.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 489 ("We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.").
186.

Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 587.

187. Donald J. Kochan, Chapter 3: Eminent Domain Law and Reform in Illinois: A
Brief Overview, in AN ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Joseph E.
Tabor ed. 2017) (explaining the broad scope courts give to the term "public use" and the
deference to legislative declarations of public use as nearly dispositive); see also generally
Kochan, "PublicUse,"supra note 159.
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that the expectation moves toward keepings." A label change could
help; so long as the Kelo-like standards exist, it is ever more important to change the label away from "Takings Clause" and thereby
hopefully push us away from the effects that frame creates in an otherwise weakly-constrained world of government officials and their
sense of authority. The choice of label affects the explanation, evaluation, expectation, and perception of the quality of the product; here,
the quality of the clause to protect property rights. The next Part explains what we can learn from a variety of disciplines about the impact of frames and labels and their power to affect the meaning, content, expectations, presumptions, and perceptions of the rights to
which they attach.
V. THE STUDY OF FRAMING: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGY,
LINGUISTICS, AND THE BUSINESS OF PRODUCT ADVERTISING, AMONG
OTHER FIELDS

This Article uses the so-called "Takings Clause" as a case study of
the power of framing (and choosing labels for) constitutional rights.
There is nothing inherent in the Fifth Amendment that requires that
we use the words "Takings Clause" to denote the set of language we
identify as dealing with takings of private property. In fact, by naming a clause for the right protected we are making an important
statement about the importance of the right. If we name a clause instead for the power authorized, though constrained, then we lose
some of the weight that should be laid upon the right at issue. The
frame matters, as this Part aims to explain.
All of us, every day, engage in framing when we communicate,
even if we do not consciously recognize it. How we say what we
choose to say affects how it is heard and how what we have said is
processed and interpreted by the listener (or reader). Those engaged
in the art of persuasion for a living understand the power of framing
more than most. The best lawyers, in particular, use framing as a
way to wrap their arguments inside an appealing package in a manner designed to win a case. Leading wordsmith and legal lexicographer Bryan Garner regularly stresses the utility and power of language choices across a number of applications. One such area is the
framing of issues and questions before a court-something every
skilled advocate must master.' 89 According to Garner, as an advocate,
188. R. Cookson, FramingEffects in Public Goods Experiments, 3 EXPERIMENTAL ECON.
55, 55 (2000) ("A framing effect is said to be present when different ways of describing the
same choice problem change the choices that people make, even though the underlying
information and choice options remain essentially the same.").
189. See generally Bryan A. Garner, The Deep Issue: A New Approach to FramingLegal
Questions, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1 (1994-1995).
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the lawyer should "want to find the premises that will pull the court
toward your conclusion, and then make your premises explicit."'9 0
Why? Because it is about setting forth those premises; in essence,
framing the case in a way that influences the court's thinking on the
subject. It is about "capturing the judicial imagination";' 9 ' Garner
posits that "[w]hoever does [this] well is most likely to win. Indeed, a
well-framed issue can often become the starting point for the majoriIn other words, "[i]f the court decides to answer the
ty opinion."
question you pose, then the court will probably reach the conclusion
you urge."

93

In reaching these conclusions on the importance of framing skills
to effectively fulfill the advocates' charge, borrowing insight from
Karl Llewellyn, Garner concludes that "if your framing is accepted,
you win." 9 4 Llewellyn very aptly explained that framing is a competitive sport:
Of course, the first thing that comes up is the issue and the first
art is the framing of the issue so that if your framing is accepted
the case comes out your way. Got that? Second, you have to capture the issue, because your opponent will be framing an issue
very differently. . . . And third, you have to build a technique of
phrasing of your issue which not only will help you capture the
Court but which will stick your capture into the Court's head so
that it can't forget it. 9 5

This passage from Llewellyn reminds us that the same issue, fact,
condition, right, power, and the like may very well be susceptible to
multiple means of framing. Further, those who understand this will
choose among the menu of possible frames that which best matches
their positional taste. The examples are endless and surround us every
day. Surely, one such example of competitive positioning through
framing and labeling is evidenced by the contrast between a "Takings
Clause" and what I propose to call the "Keepings Clause." This Part
will look deeper into the interdisciplinary research on framing effects
and apply some of its lessons to this Article's subjects.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson remind us that words form concepts that have consequences for the things to which the words at-

190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 10.

194.

Id. at 11 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L.

REV. 627, 630 (1962)).
195.

Llewellyn, supra note 194, at 630.
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tach." 6 Thus, we should understand the effects of the language choices we make, and we should make such choices carefully. Discussing
the power of language to engage with concepts of the mind, including
even those with which we are not generally aware, Lakoff and Johnson expound that "[t]he concepts that govern our thought are not just
matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning"
and they "structure what we perceive, how we get around in the
world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus
plays a central role in defining our everyday realities." 9 7 The frame
through which observations are made to form them often influences
the content of these cognitively critical concepts. Dietram Scheufele
and Shanto Iyengar explain that "framing effects refer to behavioral or
attitudinal outcomes that are not due to differences in what is being
communicated, but rather to variations in how a given piece of information is being presented (or framed) in public discourse."' 9 8
Scheufele and Iyengar provide a very easy way to start to understand framing-think of a literal frame placed around a painting.
Our perception of the painting will change depending on what type of
frame we put on it.' 99 A kindergartener's watercolor placed inside a
museum frame looks much different from when it is just stuck to the
refrigerator with a magnet. One might confuse the former as something with a market value, while one observing the latter display
would think it was cute but probably of only personal value to the
parent and not likely to catch the attention of Sotheby's. Of course,
once one knows that the frame can change the price, one can fetch for
the painting and employ framing to their own ends and literally manipulate perceived value. As Scheufele and Iyengar explain, "the art
dealer can shape public reactions to the exact same painting based on
fairly subtle variations in how she decides to present - or quite liter-

196. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language, 77
J. PHIL. 453 (1980).
197. Id. at 454.
198. Dietram A. Scheufele & Shanto lyengar, The State of Framing Research: A
Call for New Directions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 1
(2014) (assessing framing research across multiple disciplines), available at
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.001.0001/oxfordhb9780199793471-e-47 [https://perma.cc/7C2S-NFT2].
199. Id. at 20. The authors pose the following scenario:
Framing is equivalent to the choices that an art
make about how to display a painting. Reactions
painting displayed in a large, gold plated frame,
tively different than they would be if the same
simple aluminum frame.
Id.

dealer or gallery owner may
among potential buyers to a
for instance, will be distincpainting was displayed in a
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ally 'frame' - that painting."oo
At a more scientific level, framing is a phenomenon widely tested
and analyzed across a number of fields, including linguistics, semiotics, cognitive linguistics, rhetoric and discourse studies, cognitive
psychology, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, marketing,
advertising, and other fields.2 0 ' Scheufele and Iyengar posit that,
"[p]robably the most widely-cited and also all-encompassing definition of framing was provided by Gamson and Modigliani (1987) who
see frames as 'a central organizing idea or story line that provides
meaning to an unfolding strip of events .. . [t]he frame suggests what
the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.' "so0 Of course, the
frame need not surround a controversy-it can relate to a decision, a
thing, an idea, or even a legal doctrine or rule, for example. When it
comes to the Fifth Amendment, the frame can suggest whether the
thing is about the power, or it could alternatively suggest that the
thing is about property rights.
Research by Tverksy and Kahneman that has driven the development of psychology literature on framing provides a good foundational starting point for understanding the subject. 2 03 Their 1981 Science article explains that decisionmakers adopt frames to form conceptions of the "acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a
particular choice." 2 0 4 Decisions, objects, concepts, and the like can often be framed in multiple ways. They present the idea of viewing the
same mountain from different vantage points, for example, and coming away with different, sometimes mistaken, descriptions of it.2 05
Similarly, their study, which has come to be known as the "Asian disease problem," asked respondents to choose between adopting one of
two identical programs to address an outbreak of disease-one
framed in terms of how many will die, the other in terms of how
many will be saved.2 0 The results showed respondents expressing
different, inconsistent preferences, as well as different levels of risk
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Deborah Tannen, What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying
Expectations, in FRAMING IN DISCOURSE 15 (Deborah Tannen ed. 1993) (surveying several
fields covering the framing concept).

202. Scheufele & lyengar, supra note 198, at 6 (quoting W.A. Gamson & A. Modigliani,
The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action, in 3 RES. IN POL. SOC. (R. G. Braungart & M.
M. Braungart ed. 1987)).
203. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SC. 453 (1981).
204. Id. at 453.
205. Id.
206. Id. ("[I]t is easy to see that the two problems are effectively identical. The only
difference between them is that the outcomes are described in problem 1 by the number of
lives saved and in problem 2 by the number of lives lost.").
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aversion versus risk taking. They concluded that the "inconsistencies
were traced to the interaction of two sets of factors: variations in the
framing of acts, contingencies, and outcomes, and the characteristic
nonlinearities of values and decision weights."2 0 7 Most importantly

for this Article's purposes, they summarized the general implications
as follows:
[O]ne may discover that the relative attractiveness of options varies when the same decision problem is framed in different ways.
Such a discovery will normally lead the decision-maker to reconsider the original preferences, even when there is no simple way to
resolve the inconsistency. The susceptibility to perspective effects
is of special concern in the domain of decision-making because of
the absence of objective standards such as the true height of
mountains .20s
Framing the same words of constitutional text in terms of property
saved (kept) or property lost (taken) could similarly evoke inconsistent observations of an identically-worded clause.
Moreover, Tversky and Kahneman establish that the decision on
which frame to adopt and apply to a particular concept actually
changes one's behavior, not just perception.20 ' This means that "the
framing of an action sometimes affects the actual experience of its
outcomes," making "the adoption of a decision frame .

.

. an ethically

significant act." 1 o In other words, because frames can drive behavior,
we should be careful to choose frames in a way that responsibly protects the integrity of the thing to be framed. If the integrity of the
Fifth Amendment is in protecting the "right to keep" rather than encouraging exercise of the power to take, then "Takings Clause" may
be an irresponsible frame.
Lastly, Tversky and Kahneman make an important observation
about using frames to steer behavior. There is danger in such exercise, especially given that "framing influences the experience of consequences."2 1 ' Tversky and Kahneman warn that "the deliberate ma-

nipulation of framing is commonly used as an instrument of self207.

Id. at 457 ("In this article we have presented a series of demonstrations in which

seemingly inconsequential changes in the formulation of choice problems caused significant
shifts of preference.").
208. Id.
209. Id. at 458; see also Martin Dufwenberg et al., The framing of games and the psychology of play, 73 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 459, 459, 473 (2011) (describing that
"[e]xperiments in psychology and economics have shown that the framing of decisions may
matter to preferences and choice," and positing that "what is at stake may be a deepened
understanding of how circumstances shape human interaction quite generally").
210. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 203, at 458.
211. Id.
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control."2 1 2 How readers of judicial opinions that use the "Takings
Clause" language experience the consequences of the exercise of eminent domain is affected by that frame. Tversky and Kahneman explain that the person or entity who sets the frame has the ability to
influence those who are asked to view a thing through it.2 1 3 So too
then should we expect that when judges or legal scholars build a
frame around the Fifth Amendment provisions that call it the "Takings Clause," they at least implicitly invite others to adopt that moniker in their own legal analysis of the text.
Two possible lessons for judges and legal commentators follow on
this matter of setting frames and changing the perceived world of
others. The first lesson is that, because framing has these effects and
presents dilemmas regarding appropriateness of influence, those involved in framing legal doctrines and rules should be careful how
they do so. However, the second lesson is about opportunity; those
that wish to change the shape of the law might learn from the power
of framing and consider how to use frames to advance an interpretive
agenda. All in all, "framing effects are important in legal argumentation," as Lawrence Solan concludes in his extensive studies of the
power of language to impact legal interpretation. 2 1 4 "Legal anthropologists have described in considerable detail the ways in which word
choice frames issues and the ways in which lawyers attempt to make
choices to direct a case's vocabulary in a direction beneficial to the
lawyer's client," Solan explains.2 1 1 We regularly choose frames to influence reception of ideas because it has been proven that those
choices are consequential.
A substantial subfield in the study of framing effects looks at "label framing," 2 1 6 particularly in the study of cooperation games where
"the name of the game exerted a considerable effect on the partici212. Id.
213.

Id.

214. Lawrence M. Solan, Patterns in Language and Law, 6 INT'L J. LANG. & L. 46, 63
(2017) (providing a number of illustrations of the influence of frames and how they are
employed, such as how we label "alien," 'immigrant," 'undocumented [worker]," and "citizen"; how witnesses in rape cases are described as "the complaining witness" or "victims";
and others).
215. Id. (citing JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE,
AND POWER (1998); GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REDUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK
IN THE COURTROOM (1993)).
216. See, e.g., Tore Ellingsen et al., Social FramingEffects: Preferences or Beliefs?, 76
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 117 (2012) (showing significantly different cooperation rates between players in games framed in different ways); see also Kimmo Eriksson & Pontus
Strimling, Spontaneous Associations and Label FramingHave Similar Effects in the Public
Goods Game, 9 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 360 (2014); Varda Liberman et al., The
Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations Versus SituationalLabels in Determining Prisoner'sDilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1175 (2004).
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pants' choices" whether or not to initially cooperate and when and
whether to defect.2 1 7 In these studies, the framing of the game affects
how the players play it.2 18 One could, therefore, predict that regulators could play a takings "game" differently than how they might play
a "keepings" game. Varda Liberman and her coauthors report that
one interpretation of the results of differential game play based on
framing "is that the name of the game altered the participants' perception of what constituted normative play in the game and, hence,
both how they played and how they expected the majority of their
peers to play."2 " This gaming research is supported by other label
framing research more generally, including those studies which find
that "a label manipulates participants' 'subjective construal' of the
situation"; those that explain that labels " 'may serve as a cue on
comparable social situations' and that participants may 'infer others'
behavior and expectations from their life experiences' of these comparable situations"; and those that "conceive of labels as 'activating a
mental model of a situation, or frame, that seems to match the concrete situation at hand and that subsequently defines this situation.'
"220 From the conclusion that labels are part of the framing process
which affect perceptions, we can draw the inference that labels affect
how individuals perceive the meaning and quality of constitutional
text to which they are affixed.
Marketing and advertising experts are also keenly aware of the
power of labels.2 2 ' The marketing and advertising industries are dependent on understanding how consumers form opinions. These experts know that consumers use labels as part of their mental process
of judging the quality of the product; identifying its features and
characteristics; assessing the products purposes and uses; and in setting their own expectations regarding how the product is intended to
perform.2 2 2 Consumers' subsequent post-purchase evaluation of the
product often involves a comparison between the expectations generated by the marketing package-including its label-and the experi-

217.

Liberman et al, supra note 216, at 1177.

218.
219.

Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1180.

220.

Eriksson & Strimling, supra note 216, at 360-61.

221. Thomas J. Reynolds & Jonathan Gutman, Laddering Theory, Method, Analysis,
and Interpretation,1988 J. ADVERT. RES. 11, 17 (explaining the overlap of advertising with
the fields of sociology and psychology for understanding consumer associations with product attributes).
222. Kevin Lane Keller & Donald R. Lehmann, Brands and Branding: Research Findings and Future Priorities, 25 MARKETING SCI. 740, 740 (2006) (discussing the "several
valuable functions" served by brands, including sending information about product purpose
and quality).
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ence upon using the product. This Part supports the idea that consumers of law do the same thing.
The label or frame created for a product is part of its "brand,"
something defined by the American Marketing Association as "a
name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them, intended to identify the goods or services of one seller or group of
sellers and to differentiate them from those of competitors." 2 2 3 Branding is about communicating the attributes of a product and "says
something about the producer's values," according to leading marketing scholar Phillip Kotler. 2 2 4 "A brand is a complex symbol that can
convey" multiple "levels of meaning."22 5 To complete the branding
process, a company chooses a name (analogous to what this Article is
calling a "label") for the product. Kotler explains that the "desirable
qualities for a brand name" include "suggest[ing] something about
the products benefits" and "suggest[ing] concrete, 'high imagery'
qualities."2 2 6 The reason marketers focus on those metrics is because
the name or label drives the consumer's perception of the product.2 2 7
As Ries and Trout conclude, "[t]he name is the hook that hangs the
brand on the product ladder in the prospect's mind. In the positioning
era, the single most important marketing decision you can make is
what to name the product."22 8
So too do consumers of our laws reflect upon the names we give
them to decide how they feel about those laws. Do we think that most
congressional legislation is given an attractive and constituentappealing name for no reason? In fact, what is particularly important
in Kotler's full body of work on marketing is his insistence that the
lessons within it have crossover application into more than just consumer products markets.2 2' He calls this the "generic concept" of
223.

PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 418 (11th ed. 2003).

224. Id. at 418-19; see also David M. Boush, Brand Name Effects on InterproductSimilarity Judgments, 8 MKTG. LETTERS 419, 422 (1997) ("Brand names have been shown to
convey a variety of information about the products with which they are associated such as
the level of expected product quality, attributions about buyers of the products, and product origin.").
225.

KOTLER, supra note 223, at 418-19.

226. Id. at 429 ("Once a company decides on its brand-name strategy, it faces the task
of choosing a specific brand name.").
227. See id. One reason for the importance of getting the branding right is because they
tend to be sticky. Rashmi Adaval, How Good Gets Better and Bad Gets Worse: Understanding the Impact of Affect on Evaluations of Known Brands, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 352, 366
(2003) (noting that the implications from perception based on brand have long-lasting effects on memory and associations with a product).
228.

RIES & TROUT, supra note 4, at 71.

229.

Philip Kotler, A Generic Concept of Marketing, 36 J. MKTG. 46 (1972) (marketing

principles apply broadly); Philip Kotler & Sidney J. Levy, Broadening the Concept of Marketing, 33 J. MKTG. 10, 10 (1969) ("The authors see a great opportunity for marketing peo-
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marketing, 23 0 where "[m]arketing analysis and planning are relevant
in all organizations producing products and services for an intended
consuming group, whether or not payment is required." 2 3 1 Marketing
(including naming and labeling products) in this broad generic concept can include the selling of ideas and attempts to shape the receivers' view of the thing.2 3 2 Ries and Trout, in their influential book,
Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind, reach a similar conclusion:
"[T]he field of advertising is a superb testing ground for theories of
communication. If it works in advertising, most likely it will work in
politics, religion, or any other activity that requires mass communication." 2 3 3 When we choose a label for a legal right or power, we are
communicating something about the meaning of that legal text to
which the label attaches.
Although he does not speak directly to what I will call "consumers
of law," Kotler's explanation of the manipulation of perceptions
through marketing choices rings true for evaluating how the public
might judge a right or power that is being described to them:
Marketing consists of actions undertaken by persons to bring
about a response in other persons concerning some specific social
object. A social object is any entity or artifact found in society, such
as a product, service, organization, person, place, or idea. The
marketer normally seeks to influence the market to accept this social object. The notion of marketing also covers attempts to influence persons to avoid the object, as in a business effort to discourage excess demand or in a social campaign designed to influence
people to stop smoking or overeating. The marketer is basically trying to shape the level and composition of demand for his product.
The marketer undertakes these influence actions because he values their consequences. 234
The choice of our label for the Fifth Amendment property-related
provisions is the first step in the marketing of the constitutional
product, an activity we do not often equate with jurisprudential

ple to expand their thinking and to apply their skills to an increasingly interesting range of
social activity.").
230.

Kotler, Generic Concept, supra note 229, at 53 ("Generic marketing takes a func-

tional rather than a structural view of marketing.").
231. Id. at 47.
232. Id. at 51 (discussing concepts of "idea marketing" and why "[u]nder the broadened
concept of marketing, the product is no longer restricted to commercial goods and services.").
233. RIES & TROUT, supra note 4, at 2.
234. Kotler, Generic Concept, supra note 229, at 49.
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choices, but one that perhaps we should more often consider. 2 3 5
"[M]arketing applies to any social unit seeking to exchange values
with other social units," 2 3 6 and "[a]ll organizations must develop appropriate products to serve their sundry consuming groups and must use
modern tools of communication to reach their consuming publics." 2 3 7 Because marketing is "a social change process" 238 -for any organization
and for any agenda (including a pro-takings or a pro-keepings one)legal scholars should learn from the field of marketing to understand
the way in which consumers of legal outputs perceive them.
A "Takings Clause" product branding probably sends signals of good
quality for power but is likely signaling that it is a poor performer for
rights, while a "Keepings Clause" product branding likely sends signals
of quality for rights with less focus on power. 2 39 The words chosen for the
label to brand the clause are "quality [cues] ."240 In fact, marketing research in normal consumer products markets demonstrates that brandbased quality cues are what consumers generally consider one of the
more reliable heuristics for the actual quality of the product, crowding
out the noise generated by other proxies. 2 4 ' Each variation abovekeepings versus takings-stresses different attributes, causing the
reader of each to attach different expectations to the product. 2 4 2 Each

235. Kotler & Levy, supra note 229, at 15 (discussing how "[a]ll organizations are
formed to serve the interest of particular groups: hospitals serve the sick, schools serve the
students, governments serve the citizens, and labor unions serve the members.").
236.

Kotler, Generic Concept, supra note 229, at 53.

237.

Kotler & Levy, supra note 229, at 15.

238.

Sidney P. Feldman, Creating Social Change, 39 J. MKTG. 116, 116 (1975) (book

review) (endorsing ideas from marketing researchers that "marketing is basically a social
change process subject to concepts applicable to all social institutions").
239. Keller & Lehmann, supra note 222, at 746 (explaining that brands are "signals of
quality"); see also Kevin Lane Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based Brand Equity, 57 J. MKTG. 1, 3 (1993) ("The favorability, strength, and uniqueness of brand associations are the dimensions distinguishing brand knowledge that play an
important role in determining the differential response that makes up brand equity.").
240. Niraj Dawar & Philip Parker, Marketing Universals: Consumers' Use of Brand
Name, Price, Physical Appearance, and Retailer Reputation as Signals of Product Quality,
58 J. MKTG. 81 (1994) (studying brands as quality signals and describing the impact of
quality cues); see also Caglar Irmak et al., The Impact of Product Name on Dieters' and
Nondieters' Food Evaluations and Consumption, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 390, 391 (2011)
(explaining that the "name of a food item . .
is likely to act as a cue for evaluating a food's
nutritional value. Such inferences are likely to lead to diet-appropriate decisions in cases
where the product name is relatively unambiguous.").
241. Dawar & Parker, supra note 240, at 81; see also Durairaj Maheswaran et al.,
Brand Name as a Heuristic Cue: The Effects of Task Importance and Expectancy Confirmation on Consumer Judgments, 1 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 317 (1992) (discussing the fact
that brands are used as a heuristic for determining the content and quality of the product).
242. Keller, supra note 239, at 4 ("Attributes are those descriptive features that characterize a product or service-what a consumer thinks the product or service is or has and
what is involved with its purchase or consumption. . . . Product-relatedattributes are de-
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evokes a different image of the content and purposes of the same
text. 2 43
If it were the same jar of peanut butter branded and labeled in
two distinct ways, marketing experts could predict different consumer responses based on the branding and labels used. 2 4 4 Brands and
labels generate attitudes toward the product that reflect consumer
expectations about characteristics of the product 245 and what the
product symbolizes. 2 4 6 Kotler's theory of the generic concept of marketing highlights that such techniques for identifying consumer values-attribution are transferable beyond traditional consumer products. Consumers, or evaluators, of all types of things, including laws
and legal tests, engage in this type of attribute-identification. We
should expect that people will view the same Fifth Amendment in
different ways depending on how it is labeled or branded. 24 7 For example, researchers have demonstrated that, across a variety of foods
studied, simply changing the name for food products has changed
consumers' perceptions of the acceptability of the food and willingness to purchase or consume it. 2 4 8 Studying this concept, Caglar Imfined as the ingredients necessary for performing the product or service function sought by
consumers.").
243. Id. at 2 ("Brand image refers to the set of associations linked to the brand that
consumers hold in memory."); see also Adaval, supra note 227, at 353 (discussing Keller's
research on the associative networks created by brands).
244. Mary W. Sullivan, How Brand Names Affect the Demand for Twin Automobiles, 35
J. MKTG. RES. 154, 162 (1998) (even if a product is really the same, or a "twin," how it is
labeled can affect consumer perceptions); see also Ralph I. Allison & Kenneth P. Uhl, Influence of Beer Brand Identification on Taste Perception, 1 J. MKTG. RES. 36, 39 (1964) ("Participants, in general, did not appear to be able to discern the taste differences among the
various beer brands, but apparently labels, and their associations, did influence their evaluations. . . . [P]roduct distinctions or differences, in the minds of the participants, arose
primarily through their receptiveness to the various firms' marketing efforts . . . .").
245. Keller, supra note 239, at 4-5 (explaining that "one widely accepted approach" for
modelling "brand attitudes" is to see them as "a function of the associated attributes and
benefits that are salient for the brand," complete with an expectancy value generated by
the consumer).
246. Id. at 5 ("Thus, the different types of brand associations making up the brand
image include product-related or non-product-related attributes; functional, experiential,
or symbolic benefits; and overall brand attitudes. These associations can vary according to
their favorability, strength, and uniqueness.").
247. Adaval, supra note 227, at 352 (explaining that how things are branded makes a
difference in how they are viewed).
248. See, e.g., Irmak et al., supra note 240, at 401. There is actually a wide net of research on food and framing:
The domain of food and drinks provides a particularly fertile testing ground
for researching the influence of conceptual information on subjective experiences: Coke is rated higher when consumed from a cup bearing the brand logo rather than from an unmarked cup . . . a slice of turkey is rated higher if thought
to come from a popular brand rather than an unpopular one . . . Perrier is preferred to Old Fashioned Seltzer when the beverages are consumed with the la-
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rak and his coauthors, for example, reported that their "findings extend prior research on perceptions of healthfulness and consumption
of food items (Chandon and Wansink 2007a, 2007b; Howlett et al.
2009) by demonstrating that merely altering the name of a food
item-without changing any additional information provided to consumers-can affect the inferences that certain consumers make
about an item's healthfulness." 2 4 9 We should expect similar changes
in perceptions by readers of the Fifth Amendment regarding whether
it is designed to give us a healthy serving of keepings or a fatty platter full of takings, depending on how we frame the meal.
Marketing experts routinely test consumer reactions to two different brands for the same product or service and find differentials in
the consumers' reactions to those identical products or services.2

0
1

It

seems that marketing researchers may in fact provide a good model
for testing the hypothesis this Article advances-something which I
hope might get accomplished in future work.
Kotler maintains, "[m]arketing is the attempt to produce the de'

sired response by creating and offering values to the market."2 5

When one labels a constitutional provision, she is (1) making a choice
of label that reflects her preferred content for the provision; in other
words, the interpretation the labeler desires that the consumer of the
label (the public, government officials, property owners, or others)
will make of the provision;25 2 and (2) selecting the label or phrase to
accompany (in other words, frame) the provision with a word or
words that reflect substantive values (in essence, the preferred identification of the appropriate allocation of power and rights) the labeler wishes to pack into the perception of the relevant rights and

bels showing, but not otherwise . .. preference for one's favorite beer vanishes if
the labels on the beers being compared are removed . . . describing the protein
of nutrition bars as "soy protein" causes them to be rated as more grainy and
less flavorful than when the word "soy" is not included . .
bitter coffee seems
less so if consumers are repeatedly misinformed that it is not bitter . . . strawberry yogurt and cheese spreads are liked more if labeled "full-fat" than if labeled "low-fat" . . . and, intriguingly, people eat more vanilla ice cream if it is
accurately labeled "high fat" than if it is labeled "low fat."
Leonard Lee, Shane Frederick & Dan Ariely, Try It, You'll Like It: The Influence of Expectation, Consumption, and Revelation on Preferences for Beer, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 1054, 1054
(2006) (internal citations omitted).
249. Irmak et al., supra note 240, at 391.
250. Keller, supra note 239, at 13 (explaining how marketing researchers test how
consumers react to competing "elements of the marketing mix" for one brand versus another brand of the same product or service).
251. Kotler, Generic Concept, supra note 239, at 50.
252. RIES & TROUT, supra note 4 at 5 ("To be successful today at positioning .... You
must select the words which trigger the meanings you want to establish.").
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powers. 2 5 3 This process is what Ries and Trout describe as "posi-

tion[ing] the product in the mind of the prospect." 2 54 That explanation
is consistent with the remainder of Kotler's description of the marketing process, including that "[t]he marketer creates and offers value mainly through configuration, valuation, symbolization, and facilitation. (Configuration is the act of designing the social object. Valuation is concerned with placing terms of exchange on the object. Symbolization is the association of meanings with the object.[ )]"255
How we frame something can shape our expectations on how it is
meant to operate or the kinds of outputs we should expect it to generate.25 6 The framing choice sets our expectations in a certain place
for what should be anticipated, thereby normalizing certain effects.
When we expect something, it is less likely to seem unusual or aberrant, which goes a long way toward legitimizing the effect.25 1 In the
context of takings then, if the frame focuses on the power, it normalizes exercise of the power. We expect takings and they do not strike
us as unusual. The desensitization effects influence our tolerance
level for government-initiated, coercive transfers. A frame focused on
a "right to keep" has the potential to flip all of those effects toward an
expectation that takings will be rare, causing one to consider the existence of a taking unusual and susceptible to more probing scrutiny
as to its legitimacy. If you expect a taking, you would judge a taking
consistent with your expectation. If you expect a keeping, you would
judge a taking as inconsistent with that expectation.
VI.

FRAMING MATTERS

The labels with which we identify constitutional provisions focus
our attention on what is supposed to be most important about it.
Names (or labels) serve important messaging functions.25 8 When the
253. Kotler, Generic Concept, supra note 229, at 50 ("The core concern of marketing is
that of producing desired responses in free individuals by the judicious creation and offering of values.").
254.

RIES & TROUT, supra note 4, at 2 ("[P]ositioning is not what you do to a product.

Positioning is what you do to the mind of the prospect.").
255. Kotler, Generic Concept, supra note 229, at 50.
256. Andrew L. Geers & C. Daniel Lassiter, Effects of Affective Expectations on Affective
Experience: The Moderating Role of Optimism-Pessimism, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 1026, 1026-27 (2002) (noting that "a variety of studies have found that people often
assimilate their affective reactions to affective expectations").
257. Eriksson & Strimling, supra note 216, at 361 (explaining how frames influence
perceptions regarding what is "usual" and what to expect).
258. Lise H6roux et al., Consumer Product Label Processing:An Experiment Involving
Time Pressure and Distraction, 9 J. ECON. PSYCH. 195 (1988) (explaining how labels function
as communicative agents and as key components in product packaging); RIES & TROUT, supra note 4, at 99 ("The name is the first point of contact between the message and the

mind.").
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same constitutional provision can be labeled by the power that it limits or the right that it protects-the referent word drives the dominant perception of the provision.2" Labels matter. Word choices matter; they set (or reflect) priorities.2 6 0 The manner in which we choose to
frame things matters. Part V is designed to provide support for the power of framing and set the general foundation for how choosing a frame of
"Takings Clause" versus "Keepings Clause" might have some meaningful effects on the rights at play. This Part elaborates on just a few of the
possible real-world outcomes we could see if the label for these Fifth
Amendment provisions was changed to "Keepings Clause."
The Fifth Amendment provisions regarding takings are especially
apt for discussion of framing. According to Tonja Jacobi and her coauthors, James Madison wanted this clause to create "shared expectations over property rights and establishing what constitutes abuse
by the government."2 6 ' "Madison's design of the Takings Clause," Jacobi and her coauthors explain, included an intent for "the Clause to
serve a broader 'educative' function; that is, he hoped the Clause's
inclusion in a new Constitution that represented supreme law would
help educate and remind ordinary citizens of their rights, and spur
greater federal and state protection of property rights."2 6 2 What is the
proper frame for accomplishing that rights-protective "educative
function"? Surely, a "Keepings Clause" frame focused on rights does
so more than a "Takings Clause" frame.
A.

FramingEffects and the Expressive Function of Law

Far from being merely a semantic or academic difference, our
word choices to express legal doctrines and rights protections matter.
How we articulate the law has consequences. 2 63 How people behave
259. RIES & TROUT, supra note 4, at 202 ("Words are triggers. They trigger the meanings which are buried in the mind.").
260. See, e.g., Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law as Trope: Framing and Evaluating Conceptual Metaphors, 37 PACE L. REV. 89, 93 (2016) (discussing ways that language choices in
communication can "highlight, downplay, and hide" meanings and consequences).
261. Jacobi et al., supra note 154, at 620; see also Lloyd, supra note 260, at 94 (while
discussing how narratives only work if consistent with our experience, the author comments that allowing a condemnation of property without compensation "would not fit with
moral experience: it is generally not right to take property without paying for it").
262.

Jacobi et al., supra note 154, at 620.

263. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2045. As Cass Sunstein explains in his work on the
"expressive function of law":
My basic proposition is that, at least for purposes of law, any support for
"statements" should be rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of the statement, but also in plausible judgments about its effect on social norms and
hence in "on balance" judgments about its consequences. Here we can bridge
the gap between consequentialists and expressivists by showing that good expressivists are consequentialists too.
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and react to others can be influenced by how the law is expressed and
how something like government power vis-A-vis rights is framed. 26 4
The law's expressive function plays a key role in citizens' relationships with and perceptions of the law and the strength or scope of its
dictates.26 1 Individuals choose their appreciation for and determine
their willingness to support legal doctrines because of what Sunstein
describes as the "statements made by law"2 6 6 and law's "expres[sion]

function" through making statements-including statements of priority of values and policy-that signal the purposes of law and affect
the character of one's view of particular laws.267 Specifically, as Jacobi and her coauthors posit, "[o]ne principal purpose of the Constitution-and particularly the Bill of Rights-is to create focal points
that familiarize citizens about the appropriate powers of government
and their limits and to coordinate citizen expectations." 2 6 8
Applying these points to the issue at hand, it is not hard to posit
that a "Takings Clause" label expresses something quite different
from a "Keepings Clause" label, with a concomitant distinction in the
values that each label expresses. Sunstein, after all, explains how
"legal 'statements' might be designed to change social norms,""2 6 and

how one "frames" law can influence citizens perceptions of the values
the law wishes to further. 270 Janice Nadler similarly contends that
law "work[s] expressively . . . by shaping group values and norms,
which in turn influence individual attitudes."2 7 ' By reinforcing the

idea that the law's default is to allow individuals to keep what they
own, citizens will start to develop an expectation of keepings (rather
than be unalarmed by the existence of takings). According to Amitai
Aviram, individuals are influenced by the "psychic effects" of law.272
Id.
264. See id. at 2027 ("My point is only that human behavior is sometimes a function of
expressive considerations.").

265.

Id.

266. See id. at 2022 ("Many people support law because of the statements made by law,
and disagreements about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of law.").
267. See id. at 2024-25 (describing the "the expressive function of law" as "the function
of law in 'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly").
268.

Jacobi et al., supra note 154, at 620.

269.

See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2025.

270. See id. at 2025-26 (explaining how recycling mandates, for example, send a different, stronger signal about a commitment to environmental values than would simply
charging people for leaving otherwise recyclable materials in their trash).
271.

Janice Nadler, Expressive Law, Social Norms, and Social Groups, 42 L. & SOC.

INQUIRY 60, 70-71 (2017).
272.

Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law's Role in Manipulating Percep-

tions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 62-66 (2006) (citing Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is
Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765, 768 (1999); Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic Income Revisited: Response to Professors Johnson and Dodge, 45 TAX L. REV. 707, 710-
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Deviations from that expectation might cause them to question governmental decisionmakers, demand higher-level justifications for the
takings they observe, and hold them accountable. When the label is
takings-based, individuals are more likely to observe that condemnation is just a normal government action; they are more likely to believe that condemnation is what the clause is meant to authorize.
Moreover, a keepings norm-that is, a predisposition in the law
against takings-could even possibly change the attitudes of the
agents of condemnation, making them more inclined to refrain from a
taking rather than initiating one. 2 73 In fact, if we start with a presumption of keepings, there is an opportunity to expose the (government) takers to the risk of shame for their actions which constitute
"defection" from the norm274-a powerful force motivating against
condemnation. At the very least, the label's facilitation of heightened
scrutiny of the governmental actors and its establishment of a keepings norm could cause those exercising the condemnation authority
to more deeply reflect on the action and to question whether the act
is defensible in the court of public opinion.2 7 5

Kelo, for example, had an expressive effect. In expressing that the
Constitution provides very little protection from private-property seizures to serve other private interests, the Court expressed that the
"Takings Clause" itself imposes very few limits. 2 76 It expressed that

the "Public Use Clause" is toothless.27 7 Citizens and private owners
observing courts' rulings on "public use" have come to expect that
broad takings for claimed public benefits are judicially acceptable.
Moreover, governmental actors can presume from the Kelo opinion
and the Court's expression that their "public use" determinations are
almost entirely immune (in substance, if not in form) from judicial
scrutiny.

12 (1990); Amy L. Wax, Expressive Law and Oppressive Norms: A Comment on Richard
McAdams's "A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law," 86 VA. L. REV. 1731, 1739 n.9

(2000)).
273. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2026 ("Prevailing norms, like preferences and beliefs, are not a presocial given but a product of a complex set of social forces, possibly in-

cluding law.").
274. See id. at 2029-30 ("When defection violates norms, defectors will probably feel
shame, an important motivational force. The community may enforce its norms through
informal punishment, the most extreme form of which is ostracism. But the most effective
use of norms is ex ante. The expectation of shame-a kind of social 'tax,' sometimes a very
high one-is usually enough to produce compliance.").
275. See id. at 2032 ("People ....
other people's opprobrium.").

276.
277.

Sometimes they act strategically in order to avoid

See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 496 (2005).
See generally id.
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This kind of expression evidenced in Kelo is a particularly damaging form of expression of law, because, as Sunstein notes, "[w]hen the
Court makes a decision, it is often taken to be speaking on behalf of
the nation's basic principles and commitments," which "is a matter of
importance quite apart from its consequences as conventionally understood."2 7 8 The Court's expression has proliferating effects precisely

because its pronouncements help define society's relationship with
the law and society's prioritization of commitments to values. A liberally-invoked condemnation power-that has very few limitssignals that the government's power to take is vast and the citizens'
"right to keep" is weak.
As Sunstein aptly and succinctly puts it, "[t]he social meaning of
law will constrain the legitimate or permissible content of law."2 7 9 If

the social meaning of the "Eminent Domain Clause" is shaped by expressions that underscore the notion that the "public use" constraint
is weak and expressions that takings are simply a matter of government power to which we must submit under our system of government, then the perceived scope of legitimate or permissible takings is
wide. More generally, even for legitimate "public uses" for which takings may be an option, if the social meaning of these Fifth Amendment provisions is given content by its label, and its label is defined
by the power, then the power will drive the meaning.2 8 0
If, however, there is an opposite presumption and stricter adherence to the property-rule component present in the "Public Use
Clause," then the legitimate or permissible exercise of the eminent
domain power is identified as far more limited in scope. In such a legal environment, owners are empowered to more often say "no" and
enjoin the government from a taking. Again, more generally, even for
those takings that could be justified as serving a "public use," if the
social meaning of the Fifth Amendment is driven by a "keepings" label, then the rights will drive the meaning, and the expectations will
be that takings, even when they might serve "public uses," should be
rare.
This conclusion-that a switch in the label to a rights-based word
like "keepings" can help drive a more rights-based social meaning-is
supported by Sunstein's conclusions that the expressive function of
law can be altered. He explains that shifts in norms are possible, positing that "the law might be enlisted as a corrective.
278.

. .

. Here the goal

Id. at 2028.

279. See id. at 2050; see also id. at 2048 ("[A]ny description of the effects of some legal
rule is a product of expressive norms that give consequences identifiable social meaningsincluding norms that deny legal significance to certain consequences.").
280. RIES & TROUT, supra note 4, at 202 ("In a sense, every product or service is 'packaged goods.' If it [is not] sold in a box, the name becomes the box.").
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is to reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning of
action through a legal expression or statement about appropriate behavior."' Consistent with the research on the ability of framing to
affect function in Part V of this Article, refraining can shift the expressive message of the law when it chooses to attach a label to a
particular constitutional right.2 8 2
The choice of label creates the frame; the frame drives the expression; and the expression affects the respect given to the right and sets
the expectations for governmental behavior associated with it. This
Article's proposal to shift our frame regarding eminent domain to one
with a "Keepings Clause" label rather than a "Takings Clause" label
might then have the same effect of reconstructing the existing norms
that presume legitimacy for the exercise of the eminent domain power into norms that more often question its use. These norms could
shift to more readily trigger questions like "why was this person not
allowed to keep their property?" rather than "what did the government take this time?"
The language of law can have a signaling effect of what matters,
even if the underlying legal dictates do not change. Remember that
marketing experts have already figured out that naming and labeling
products on your grocery shelves or those that pop up in your Amazon search is important. Similarly, Sunstein again has insight. In his
work on the expressive function of law, he discusses the simple power
of announcing a new law, such as littering is forbidden or owners
must clean up after dogs. 2 8 3 Even if neither law is accompanied by
further enforcement, he describes how such a pronouncement of a
law on the issue in and of itself, even if it does not create a different
level of legal enforcement for a norm, can change perceptions and alter behavior toward greater appreciation for the value expressed
(namely, people litter less and use baggies to collect dog poop during
walks) .284
If we change our label from what is now almost universally considered the "Takings Clause" to the "Keepings Clause," we might
have the type of effect that Sunstein has identified in other areas of
law, where "[o]ften law's 'statement' is designed to move norms in

281.

See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2031.

282. Scheufele & lyengar, supra note 198, at 1 ("The concept of framing embodies a
context-sensitive explanation for shifts in political beliefs and attitudes.").
283.

See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2032-33.

284. See id. (discussing
inculcating the expectation
from the announced norm"
help reconstruct norms and

the "important effect in signalling appropriate behavior and in
of social opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate
so that "[w]ith or without enforcement activity, such laws can
the social meaning of action.").
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fresh directions.""8 That fresh direction could come from changes in
policy, changes in constitutional understanding, changes in the expectations of the general public, changes in the public's willingness to
accept particular condemnations without asking questions as to why
some alternative was not available, or simply changes in the wouldbe condemners' reflective processes. Consider, for example, the consequences to a legislator if the expectation shifts towards more keepings and less takings. George Akerlof speaks of the means of retaliation available to consumers of products when the products do not
meet the expectations of their branding.2 86 Accountability measures
might also serve as a possible way to check nonadherence to the
keepings brand and insure the brand is living up to its reputation.2 17
Furthermore, it would be far easier to learn that a keepings norm
has been infringed (one need just learn that a taking has occurred)
than it is to evaluate whether a presumptively-allowable takings
norm has been abused. Therefore, a switch to a "Keepings Clause"
brand deems governmental transgressions of such presumption even
more transparent than if we were operating under a presumption of
legitimacy of each taking. Each of the above-mentioned possible alternative states resulting from an adjusted frame might contribute to
a system that is more sensitive to property rights; more understanding of the personal attachments we form with our property; more
generous regarding the surplus values we associate with such property that can never be fully replaced with a monetary compensation
system; and generally more respectful of the rights of property owners to keep what they own.
B.

Other Systemic Effects on Stability of Possession and Owner
Confidence

If we can accomplish a paradigm shift with a refraining of the
Fifth Amendment's property protections under a new label like
"Keepings Clause," then we might generate a greater sensitivity to
property rights and a greater skepticism of the authority or necessity
to use eminent domain, which would result in a lower frequency of
takings. Instability of possession caused by excessive takings practic285.

See id. at 2051.

286. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 499-500 (1970) ("Brand names not only indicate quality
but also give the consumer a means of retaliation if the quality does not meet expectations.
For the consumer will then curtail future purchases.").
287. Mary Sullivan, Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-BrandedProducts, 63 J.
BUS. 309, 310 (1990) ("The economics literature has long viewed brand reputation as a
mechanism used by firms to insure quality to consumers." (citing Frederich A. Hayek, The
Meaning of Competition, in FREDERICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER
(1948))).
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es is detrimental to the property system.2 8 8 If we lower the incidence

of takings, the market will perceive less risk to property being taken
(including less risk to condemnation awards not covering the investments made in the property or the long-term stability of ownership
that could come from those investments).
Refraining as the "Keepings Clause" might contribute to a lower
incidence of takings in a number of ways. Respect for the "right to
keep" might increase, with accompanying restraint from governmental actors and higher expectations from property owners and the public that takings will be a true last resort. A keepings-based framework could deter governmental actors from aggressive use of takings
out of fear of alienating an electorate that is increasingly informed by
a presumption that takings-avoidance should be the norm, accordingly demanding restraint. A change in frame might also have the ability to precipitate a greater sensitivity to the "right to keep" in the
courts, perhaps even causing them to rethink the presently nearimpenetrable deference to legislative determinations of "public use,"
for example. First, we change the label so that perceptions can begin
to change, which might cause government officials to change attitudes, citizens to change expectations, and perhaps courts to revisit
takings-empowering doctrines. Each of these possible individual categories of altered mindset and behavior would contribute to a gradual
paradigm shift that ultimately could result in a more investmentfriendly atmosphere.
Strong protections for the "right to keep" property motivate behavior, including instilling the feelings of confidence, security, and stability that motivate acquisition of and investment in property. In other
words, the level of confidence one has in his ability to keep property
once acquired affects his incentives, including his willingness to expend resources to acquire that property in the first place.2 8 1 Individu-

als will not make improvements or other investments in property if
they do not have a high degree of certainty that they can keep the
property they enhance.9 o
Strengthening these property attributes not only encourages investment but also increases the market value of the property. Potential buyers will pay more for things they believe they get to keep; or
288. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 552-59 (discussing generally the
importance of stability in property ownership and policing mechanisms for the same).

289. Id.
290. Hernando de Soto, Law Connects, Remarks at the IBA Annual Conference (Oct.
12, 2008), in 62 NO. 6 INT'L BAR NEWS 14, 16 (Dec. 2008) ("[G]lobally . .
the problem is
that nobody's going to invest unless they know who owns it, or that they own it. Nobody's
going to remove the rocks; nobody's going to put in the irrigation systems or the roads,
until they feel they own it.").
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rather own. Thus, the more confidence market participants have in
the ability for every owner to keep their property until they voluntarily choose to dispose of it, the higher those market players will price
property.
Government can provide certainty to market participants in the
undisturbed ownership of the assets they exchange by providing a
legal infrastructure with a particular frame that generates high levels of confidence that the government will respect ownership, will not
confiscate property once acquired or make investments once made,
and will not otherwise disrupt or interfere with the sanctity or enforceability of the exchange.2 9 ' In other words, when the government
respects the "right to keep," positive stability reactions follow. Epstein explains that, by setting the default in our legal system as one
where a right to refuse is honored, we help keep the heart of a stable
property system beating. Epstein asserts, "[w]hat makes this system
work is the stability of possession that David Hume recognized as
one of the dominant rules of society. Thus, transactions take place
only if both sides agree to them, which means that all individuals
keep their holdings until they agree to part with them."2 9 2
The easier it is to have ownership taken away, the less secure we
feel. 2 9 3 Behavior will adapt to the environment that is framed. If that
atmosphere projects insecurity-such as sending signals that taking
is liberally tolerated-investment will suffer. If, however, the frames
we choose project that keeping is the norm, we should expect a positive effect. Security, stability, and certainty in ownership work to encourage transactions and movement of property in commerce.
C. A PresumptionToward Keepings Might Mitigate the
Under-compensationProblem
A frame that draws a heightened focus on the "right to keep," with
the concomitant channeling of behavior toward less takings and more
consensual transfer negotiations that respect it, has the benefit of
avoiding the fraught calculation of "just compensation." Thus, a
change in our frame might mitigate the undercompensation problem
in takings law.

291. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 552 ("[A] property system with
stable rights increases the value of assets to users (now owners) and decreases the costs of
obtaining and defending those assets.").
292.

Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 156, at 2097.

293. Way, supra note 147, at 121 ("Security in ownership-the principle that an owner's property rights cannot be taken away, except by the government with just compensation-is a fundamental attribute of American property ownership.").
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Even if courts work diligently to approximate fair market value, it
is not a substitute for true value to an owner. 2 9 4 People form attachments to property and assess what they own as having special, meaningful value. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously spoke of owners' attachment to property in the context of adverse possession, describing
such connections as reflecting "the deepest instincts of man" when
"[a] thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it."295 Jill Fraley has described
owners as developing a "foundational fear of dispossession"2 9 6 resulting from the feelings of connectedness, completeness, and control
that humans associate with their property.29 ' This individualized
value is sometimes called "reserve value" or "surplus value."2 9 8 Because these subjective values are impossible to validate when determining damages, compensation awards are forced to use the "fair
market value" standard, which is supposed to objectively look outward toward what a prospective buyer would pay, rather than the
value the owner attaches and the price at which the owner would be
willing to sell.2 9 9 The consequence, however, is that, when the government takes land and is only required to pay the diminished market value, the current owner may not be fully compensated. She may
attach personal value to her property in excess of that fair market
value calculation, or she may be able to find someone to whom she
could sell her property rights that values the property more than the
average person in the market may.3 00
294. Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
110, 116 (2002) ("[T]he concept of fair market value is essentially a fiction in the context of
takings of property."). But see Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation:The Idiosyncrat-

ic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2013) (challenging the validity of
the critiques of compensation as inadequate).

295.

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897);

see also GREEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 2, § N, 211, 214 (1886), reprinted in THOMAS HILL
GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1921) (discussing the appropriation of external things by fashioning them, making them thereafter "cease to be external as they were before," and then making them "become a sort of extension of the man's
organs, the constant apparatus through which he gives reality to his ideas and wishes").

296. Jill Fraley, The Meaning of Dispossession,50 IND. L. REV. 517, 518 (2017).
297. Id. at 529-30 (generally discussing the concept of deep feelings of attachments by
humans to property).
298.

Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation, supra note 169, at 871, 885; Robert

C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1538-39 (1982).
299. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (describing the fair
market value standard).
300.

Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can't Buy Me Love: Monetary Versus In-Kind Reme-

dies, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 151 (2013) (explaining why damages remedies might possibly "routinely fail to provide adequate compensation" because individuals "strongly prefer
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In this light, the current "fair market value" standard for calculating "just compensation" in takings law is inadequate given the surplus value that many owners have in their properties. 3 0 1 Part of the
reason the "current compensation scheme is suboptimal," as Bell and
Parchomovsky posit, is precisely because the "types of value" considered in "just compensation" remedies fail to include owner utility associated with personal, emotional attachment to property. 3 0 2 "Fair
market value" fails to include individual utility from nonfinancial
sources, 30 3 meaning that the owner will often value the property more
than the market price reflects.3 0 4 Different people value the same
property differently based on a variety of factors that cannot be reduced easily to objective tests. 3 0 5
For example, Bell and Parchomovsky explain that, "[i]n cases of
sentimental attachment, the owner finds in the asset emotional utility not accessible to other market participants and, therefore, not reflected in the market price." 3 0 6 Consequently, "the price at which the
owner will agree to sell the asset (the reserve price) will exceed the
price that ordinary market participants will pay (the market
price)."307

In the face of the price disparity between fair market price and reserve price, Epstein explains that the "risk of undercompensation" is
"acute under the current law of eminent domain, in which the levels of
compensation generated systematically ignore all elements of subjecin-kind entitlements and remedies over monetary ones. . . . [T]hey would rather be given
the very thing to which they were entitled than receive a monetary substitute, however
accurately calculated.").
301. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 295 (2006) (discussing eminent domain law as one of the areas where the law "under-

protect[s]" the personal interest in the home, and advocating that "courts and legislatures
should change their approach to just compensation, which currently focuses only on the
fair market value of the property, to take into account the personal interest in the home.");
Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation, supra note 169, at 885 ("James Krier and
Christopher Serkin, for example, note that takings law fails to compensate for the gap
between subjective and market values, and label it the consumer surplus." (citing James E.
Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 866. (2004))).
302. Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation, supra note 169, at 871, 885.
303. Id. at 873 ("[I]n practice, current law settles for the payment of the market value
of the property taken-a benchmark that often falls far short of the reserve price of the
aggrieved owner. Thus, takings law permits undercompensation whenever the reserve
value of the property owner exceeds market price.").
304. Stewart v. Parish Sch. Bd. of St. Charles Parish, 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (E.D. La.
1970), aff'd sub nom. 400 U.S. 884 (1970) ("A ten thousand dollar house to one person may
mean more to that person than a hundred thousand dollar house to another.").
305. Ellickson, supra note 298, at 1538-39 (explaining preference differentials and why
surplus value is individualized: different owners value different uses differently).
306. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 568.
307. Id.
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tive loss and consequential damages brought on by deliberate government action."30 8 Many of the individual values owners attach to their
property are either undercompensated or wholly uncompensated.3 0 9
Moreover, it is not just sentimental or other emotional value that
is affected; it is also the value we get from durability of ownership.
Bell and Parchomovsky remind us that a system with liberal powers
to exercise eminent domain also adversely affects "the value of stability that lies at the property system's heart." 3 1 0
Epstein argues that it is possible for courts to adjust compensation
upward to effect what would be a "de facto property rule," because
the consequences would be high enough to serve as a deterrent, 3 1 1
and legislatures too might consider compensation premiums to deter
takings. 3 1 2 Yet, neither of these resolutions seem imminent.
Coerced transfers of property rights fail to guarantee a mutually
beneficial exchange. The usefulness of contracts law is that it creates
individualized determinations of value such that both parties to a
contract benefit from the transaction. 3 1 3 Only when the state or any
other purchaser is forced to bargain with a property owner for acquir-

308. Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 156, at 2093; see also Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, supra note 294, at 111 ("The most striking feature of American compensation law-even in the context of formal condemnations or expropriations-is that just
compensation means incomplete compensation. Compensation is strictly limited to . . . fair
market value of the property taken. Other consequential damages incurred by the property
owner are ignored.").
309.

Consider, for example, this statement by Judge Richard Posner in a takings case:

[M]arket value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his
property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many owners are "intramarginal" meaning that because of relocation costs,
sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than its
market value (i.e., it is not "for sale"). Such owners are hurt when the government takes their property and gives them just its market value in return. The
taking in effect confiscates the additional (call it "personal") value that they obtain from the property.

Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
310. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 604 ("With fewer tools to defend
her property rights [in the liability rule-based eminent domain scheme], the property owner enjoys less stability in her ownership, and presumably may extract less value.").
311.

Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 156, at 2096.

312. Id. at 2114 (describing a suggested reform of compensation premiums that are
designed to deter takings).

313.

Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (ex-

plaining why bargaining is often most efficiently coordinated through injunctions because
it allows for protection of individualized value, allowing a party to set her price, based on
the "premise of our free-market system . .
that prices and costs are more accurately determined by the market than by government").
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ing his land can a more balanced scheme of compensation occur. 3 1 4 In
a compensation scheme based on fair market value, the harm done to
property owners by governmental takings may be diminished, but it
will never be eliminated. Thus, rules or cultures that force the government back into a competitive market framework are likely to protect the concept of mutually-beneficial exchange. 3 15 Moreover, individual owners might even be more likely to bargain with the state
when not faced with a threat of a coerced transfer. 3 1 6
Because no system of compensation can perfectly replace the value
owners attach to their property, it is clear that protection and
preservation, not merely compensation, must be the focus if the system wants to maximize its respect for individualized property rights.
Minimizing the number of takings that actually occur should be a
goal-avoiding the problem of governmental undercompensation in
the first place. The powerful impact of eminent domain on ownership
and its displacement of property rights is, and always was, meant to
be only a power of last resort. 31 7 Re-framing the Fifth Amendment
protections as the "Keepings Clause" better reflects the spirit of those
guarantees as, at the very least, a quasi-property rule, enforced by
self-restraint, in which the government employs its power of eminent
domain only in situations of necessity; that is, when addressing concerns not susceptible to private solutions. 3 18
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has catalogued usage to demonstrate the relatively
recent provenance of the label "Takings Clause." Because this frame
has no special status, there is no reason not to question whether another label could better reflect the values we wish to convey under

314. Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice, supra note 93, at 221 (criticizing "the new trend
favoring liability-rule protection for entitlements and vindicates the superiority of property
rules," concluding that property rules should be favored "when bargaining is feasible and

highlight[ing] the shortcomings of bargaining in the shadow of liability rules").
315. Id. at 255-56 (the findings regarding property rules as facilitating cooperation "bears
important normative implications, all supporting the adoption of property rules whenever
possible. . . . [U]nder property-rule protection, there will be greater scope for potential efficient transactions and larger efficiency gains to be divided among the parties.").
316. Id. at 253-54 (explaining studies that show why individuals may be more willing
to bargain and more willing to sell if the starting position is one where they hold the property by a property rule; if they know that the property can ultimately be taken under a
liability rule, they will be resistant to bargaining).
317.

See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 148, at 173-74 (discussing the concept of necessity).

318. Brauneis, supra note 148, at 938-39 (finding in Supreme Court jurisprudence a
"substantive assertion . .
that the Just Compensation Clause is and always was understood to be a partial, incomplete protection of property rights in general").

1094

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1021

the rights-protective language in the property provisions of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The true imperative of the constitutional protections guaranteed
in the "Takings Clause" should be to maximize keepings and minimize takings. The stability of property rights is dependent upon having the scales tipped in that direction. 3 1 9 Changing how we frame
rights and powers, and how the government projects its understanding of them, can change perceptions, change expectations, and increase confidence, thereby motivating productive behavior. 3 2 0 Framing can work to create a more stable property system with the added
benefit of better protecting the rights demanded by the Fifth
Amendment. 32 1

Finally, regardless of whether one supports refraining through the
relabeling of the now-called "Takings Clause" to the "Keepings
Clause" or something else, this Article had another, broader goal that
is not dependent on being convinced of the wisdom of that change.
The additional objective was to use the takings provisions as a case
study, provoking further thought on how we do and should label, and
thereby frame, constitutional rights. At the very least, this Article
sought to provide a framework for understanding the impact and influence of frames and encourage continued discussion on whether we
have chosen appropriate labels to create proper, effective, and accurate frames for important aspects of our legal system.

319. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 603 ("[T]he government's ability
to seize property directly undermines the stability of property rights."); see also MADISON,
PROPERTY, supra note 150, at 266 ("[A]s a man is said to have a right to his property, he
may be equally said to have a property in his rights. Where an excess of power prevails,
property of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his possessions.").
320. Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 156, at 2120 ("The choice between property
rules and liability rules should normally be resolved in favor of the former to preserve the
stability of possession and social expectations that are necessary for the growth of any
complex social order.").
321. Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory, supra note 75, at 538 (explaining how our legal
assumptions are often "predicated on the insight that property law as a legal institution is
organized around creating and defending the value inherent in stable ownership").
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APPENDIX C

Additional Illustrations of Labeling Usage in Court Opinions Across

Time 322
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322. Data compiled by searching Westlaw and reviewing cases retrieved; verification
searches completed on Lexis and Ravel.
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